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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (FCA) is arguably one of the federal government’s 
most powerful weapons to fight against fraudulent government 
contractors.1  The Act operates as a deterrent of mass destruction to prevent 
third-party government contractors from submitting false or fraudulent 
claims for payment to the federal government.2  Virtually any transaction 
between a private business and the federal government falls under the 
purview of the FCA.3  To put it another way, it is of the utmost importance 




1. See Craig Margolis & Christina Ferma, The False Claims Act: Why Should A Civil Statute Matter 
to Criminal Lawyers?, 31 CRIM. JUST. 26, 26–27 (2017) (“Penalties for violating the FCA are severe.”);  
see also Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/C5JE-U3LJ] (“[T]he False Claims Act serves as 
the government’s primary civil remedy to redress false for government funds . . . .”); see also S. REP. 
NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (claiming the FCA is a “powerful 
tool in deterring fraud”). 
2. See Margolis, supra note 1, at 26 (“The FCA prohibits companies and individuals from 
submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the government.”); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, 
at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (describing the FCA’s strength in deterring 
fraud). 
3. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009). 
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understands the FCA in order to shield itself from liability.4   
The FCA painstakingly lays out seven detailed elements which create 
liability under the act.5  Thankfully, however, federal courts have 
consistently summed up the FCA as requiring three basic elements to 
establish liability.6  First, a contractor must knowingly act fraudulently; 
second, the contractor then must subsequently present to the federal 
government a claim for payment; and, lastly, the claim must be fraudulent 
and material to the government’s decision.7  However, Congress did not 
intend the FCA to be a device used to punish a contractor for immaterial 
misrepresentations.8   
On one hand, proponents of the FCA claim the Act is the best weapon 
the government has at its disposal to battle fraud.9  On the other hand, 
critics posit that the FCA is too powerful and is used at times to police mere 
contractual disputes.10  Interestingly, the Supreme Court noted the FCA 
was not intended as an “all-purpose” statute to prosecute simple contractual 
issues.11  
Because the FCA is the federal government’s primary deterrent against 
contractor fraud, it should not come as a shock to learn that between 2014 
and 2018, the government brought 630 new lawsuits under the FCA—
around two new FCA suits per week.12  In the 2018 fiscal year alone, the 
 
4. See Angela Bergman, No Consensus on Materiality: Courts Continue to Grapple With Escobar’s Key 
Holdings, INSIDE THE FCA (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.insidethefca.com/no-consensus-on-
materiality-courts-continue-to-grapple-with-escobars-key-holdings/ [https://perma.cc/FR4V-5JLY] 
(noting how Escobar’s materiality standard creates a need for government contractors need to remain 
vigilant of anything that could create incur liability for them under the FCA). 
5. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2009). 
6. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into 
A Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 462 (1998) (providing three basic elements that trigger liability 
under the FCA). 
7. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399, 
402 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (summarizing the elements that trigger liability under the FCA); see also id. (listing 
the three basic elements of FCA liability as interpreted by most courts). 
8. See Natasha Boyadzieva, The False Claims Act and the Escobar Decision: What is on the Horizon for 
the Healthcare Industry, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (discussing the FCA’s limitations). 
9. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269. 
10. See Jerad Whitt, Comment, I’m Not Calling You a Liar . . . : Implied Certification Theory Under the 
False Claims Act, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 451, 451 (2017) (noting critics of the FCA worry the act will be 
used to “punish run-of-the-mill breaches of contract”). 
11.  Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008). 
12. See Jessica Sanderson & Michael Volkov, False Claims Act 2018 Year in Review—Making Sense 
of the DOJ Fraud Statistics, JD SUPRA (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/false-claims-
act-2018-year-in-review-62368/ [https://perma.cc/8Z5S-6GN6] (explaining how often the federal 
government brought new cases under the FCA in 2018). 
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federal government recovered over $2.8 billion from suits brought under 
the FCA.13  In fact, the federal government earned more than $2 billion 
each year over the past nine years from FCA lawsuits.14 
Furthermore, the FCA allows relators—colloquially known as 
“whistleblowers”15—to bring suits against allegedly fraudulent government 
contractors on behalf of the federal government,16 and these relators can 
continue a suit under the FCA even if the federal government elects not to 
intervene.17  And, if the suit is successful, relators are entitled to a 
percentage of the judgment or settlement under the FCA.18  Due to this 
financial incentive, whistleblowers earned over $7 billion between 1987 and 
2018 from suits brought under the FCA.19 
The FCA is an important statute because it protects the federal 
government from being defrauded by third parties.20  However, the FCA is 
ambiguous on certain issues, and various circuit courts have not interpreted 
these ambiguous issues consistently.21  Thus, the FCA has caused confusion 
among the federal circuit courts over the years.22  In 2016, the Supreme 
Court resolved a significant point of confusion with its decision in Universal 
Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar (Escobar II),23 validating and 
 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/civil/ 
page/file/1080696/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9Y 
ZL-SWC8].  
14. See Sanderson & Volkov, supra note 12 (summarizing and graphing the number of, and the 
amount recovered from, FCA cases from 1987 to 2017); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 13 
(analyzing the settlement and judgment awards gained under the FCA by fiscal year). 
15. See Protect the False Claims Act, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR. (Oct. 28, 2019 1:38 PM), 
https://www.whistleblowers.org/protect-the-false-claims-act/ [https://perma.cc/9WNB-4WR4] 
(discussing the qui tam provision, also known as the “whistleblower provision,” of the FCA).  For the 
purpose of this Comment, the term “relator” and “whistleblower” will be used interchangeably. 
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3729–30 (2009–2010). 
17. Id. at § 3730(c)(3). 
18. Id. at § 3730(d). 
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW, supra note 13. 
20. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme 
Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the 
False Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1233–34 (2018) (noting the intention of the False Claims 
Act). 
21. See id. at 1234 (explaining how the varying state laws and regulations created differing circuit 
interpretations of the FCA).  
22. See id. (noting how the varying state laws and regulations created differing circuit 
interpretations of the FCA).  
23. See generally Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 
(2016) (holding under certain circumstances, cases may be brought using implied certification theory 
under the FCA). 
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allowing for claims to be made under the FCA using the implied false 
certification theory.24   
Under the implied false certification theory, the government or a 
whistleblower may bring a claim under the FCA in instances where a 
contractor does not disclose violations of statutory or contractual 
obligations materially linked to the government’s decision to pay the 
contractor.25  Circuit courts varied for years about whether the implied false 
certification theory was a valid method to bring forth a claim under the 
FCA.26  Yet, despite the Court clearing up the confusion surrounding the 
implied false certification theory of the FCA, the Escobar decision created 
even more confusion among the circuits regarding the issue of materiality.27  
In Escobar, the Court described the FCA’s materiality standard as 
demanding and emphasized how not all contractual terms of an agreement 
are material to the federal government’s decision to pay a contractor.28  The 
Court further placed a check on the FCA, stating that when a government 
agency has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and yet 
continues to pay or pays the contractor in full, said payment is strong 
evidence that the contractor’s noncompliance was immaterial to the 
government’s decision to make a payment.29  The Court’s opinion in Escobar 
seemingly posits that if the federal government has actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the contractor, then the 
noncompliance was not at all material in the government’s decision to pay.30  
But, in the years since the Escobar decision, the issue of a government 
agency’s continued payment or payment in full despite the agency’s actual 
 
24. Id. at 1999.  
25. Id. at 1995. 
26. See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud That “Counts” 
Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1820–21 (2017) (explaining the circuit split 
regarding interpretation of the implied false certification theory under the FCA). 
27. See Vince Farhat et al., Emerging Trends in False Claims Act Enforcement: 2018 Outlook, JD SUPRA 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/emerging-trends-in-false-claims-act-88123/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3AM-GE7H] (“Federal appellate courts have begun to interpret the Escobar 
materiality standard in varying ways.”). 
28. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.  Although the materiality standard originated in Escobar II, this 
Comment will refer to the standard as the “Escobar materiality standard” for simplicity.  Additionally, 
the Escobar II decision will frequently be referred to as Escobar in the body of the text. 
29. Id. at 2003–04. 
30. See generally id. at 2003–04 (stating the government’s actual knowledge of noncompliance on 
a contract and the government’s continued payment of the contract provide strong evidence that the 
noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay). 
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knowledge of a contractor’s compliance created a split between the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits,31 and much confusion among the others.32 
Since Escobar, the issue regarding the materiality of an FCA claim not only 
caused confusion among the federal circuit courts, but also among the 
companies who regularly contract with the federal government.33  Simply 
put, these companies want some bright-line rules for the FCA.34  However, 
despite the call from the business community for a consistent standard, and 
a circuit split regarding materiality, the Supreme Court continually declines 
to clarify the materiality standard it proffered in Escobar.35  A bright-line rule 
regarding the FCA’s materiality standard is necessary.36  The existing 
confusion surrounding the issue for private businesses and the high amount 
of confusion among the federal circuit courts are evidence of this 
necessity.37   
This Comment suggests the Fifth Circuit’s position on the materiality of 
an FCA complaint is the appropriate bright-line rule.38  Specifically, this 
Comment suggests that when the government has actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance and, despite this knowledge, continues to pay 
or pays the contractor in full, the FCA claim against the contractor must 
 
31. Compare United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–63 
(5th Cir. 2017) (explaining how a government agency’s payment in full or continued payment creates a 
near insurmountable presumption that a contractor’s noncompliance was not material, causing the 
complaint to fail for lack of materiality), with United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 
862 F.3d 890, 905 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Escobar materiality standard to mean that when the 
government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the contractor, said 
payment can still be proof of the noncompliance’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay);  
see also Daniel Seiden, Fraud Law Circuit Splits Endure as Top Court Ruling Turns 3 (1), BLOOMBERG LAW 
(June 14, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/federal-contracting/circuit-splits-over-
fraud-law-endure-as-top-court-ruling-turns-3 [https://perma.cc/N7M4-WEBH] (noting the Escobar 
decision created circuit splits). 
32. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing the confusion among the circuit courts regarding 
Escobar’s materiality standard). 
33. See Seiden, supra note 31 (describing the confusion felt in the business community about the 
FCA).  
34. Id. 
35. See id. (noting the Supreme Court declined to hear cases regarding the FCA’s materiality 
standard from either the Fifth or Ninth Circuits). 
36. See id. (examining the need for a bright-line rule). 
37. See id. (noting the confusion felt in both the circuit courts and business community). 
38. See Vince Farhat, et al., supra note 27 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s application of the 
materiality standard). 
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automatically fail for lack of materiality.39  A bright-line rule such as this 
would ease the burden on the courts who adjudicate the immense number 
of suits brought under the FCA.  More so, this rule would also ease some 
of the business community’s confusion and concern about accruing liability 
under the FCA.40  Furthermore, this bright-line rule would force the federal 
government to be more mindful of how it spends taxpayer funds, and this 
rule would provide a reasonable check on the federal government’s ability 
to earn billions from an extremely broad and powerful act.41  Finally, this 
bright-line rule would end the current split between the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits, providing clarity for all the circuits in the country.42  
This Comment begins with a brief historical discussion of the FCA to 
provide background information and context.  Next, this Comment 
discusses the Escobar decision and its impact on the FCA.  Then, this 
Comment discusses the Fifth Circuit’s position on a violation’s 
immateriality to the government’s payment decision when the government 
has actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation and continues to pay the 
contractor regardless of this knowledge.  This Comment will also discuss 
the positions of a few other federal circuits with similar holdings to the 
Fifth Circuit.  This Comment will then examine the Ninth Circuit’s position 
on the materiality of a claim under the FCA regarding the impact of the 
government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and the 
government’s payment despite this knowledge.  Finally, this Comment 
posits the Fifth Circuit’s position as an appropriate bright-line rule regarding 
materiality of a claim made under the FCA for the reasons stated in the 
previous paragraph. 
II.    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 




39. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003–04 
(2016) (describing the government’s actual knowledge of noncompliance on a contract and the 
government’s continued payment of the contract provide strong evidence that the noncompliance was 
immaterial to the government’s decision to pay). 
40. See Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the confusion felt in the circuit courts and business 
community). 
41. See id. (validating the confusion and concerns felt by the business community). 
42. See id. (noting the current split on the materiality standard as applied by the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits). 
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to deter defense contractors from committing fraud.43  Defense contractor 
fraud was incredibly rampant and bold during this time, with reports of the 
United States Army receiving crates of sawdust instead of the weapons 
needed to end the war.44  Thus, in 1863, Congress passed the FCA to 
combat unscrupulous government contractors, and, upon President 
Lincoln’s signature, the Act colloquially became known as “Lincoln’s 
Law.”45 
The FCA remained in its original form until the 1940s with the rise of 
World War II.46  During this time, Congress saw fit to limit the substantial 
power behind the Act.47  When Congress amended the FCA in 1943, it 
placed a knowledge limitation on the Act.48  This “knowledge bar” 
prevented relators from bringing claims under the FCA if the government 
agency involved in the dispute had knowledge of the alleged fraud.49  The 
1943 amendment culled the excessive number of FCA cases the government 
prosecuted until Congress decided to substantially strengthen the Act in 
1986.50 
In 1986, Congress—to once again battle rampant fraud by defense 
contractors—supercharged the FCA.51  The 1986 amendment created an 
easier avenue for individuals to file FCA claims before a court and provided 
an exemption to the knowledge bar, previously implemented with the 1943 
 
43. See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam 
Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their Application in the 
United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 36 (1991) 
(providing a history of the creation and application of the False Claims Act). 
44. Id. at 35. 
45. See Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Comment, Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied 
Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236–37 (2013) (discussing 
how “Lincoln’s Law” came into being). 
46. See Christina Parel, Note, Striving for Consistency: Implied False Certification Theory After Escobar, 
47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 461, 464 (2018) (“In 1943, Congress amended the FCA to bar qui tam actions 
based on information already in the government’s possession.”). 
47. See id. at 464 (describing how Congress weakened the FCA during the 1940s). 
48. See Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The Impact of the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 19 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 97, 99–100 
(2017) (discussing the 1943 amendment to the FCA). 
49. Id.  
50. See id. at 100 (stating the scope of the FCA “significantly expanded” because of three 
amendments starting in 1986). 
51. See Rachel V. Rose, Appreciating the Impact of Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex 
rel. Escobar in False Claims Act Actions, 63 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (2016) (summarizing what the 1986 
amendment added to the FCA in order to strengthen the Act).  See generally S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2–3 
(1986) (discussing the government’s need to protect the Department of Defense from being defrauded 
as the reason for drafting the 1986 amendment to the FCA). 
8
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 6
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/6
  
2021] COMMENT 601 
amendment.  The 1986 amendment made it easier for FCA claims to be 
brought in court and provided an exemption to the knowledge bar, 
previously implemented with the 1943 amendment.52  Under the 1986 
amendment, if the government’s knowledge of a contractor’s alleged fraud 
came from a whistleblower, then that knowledge did not bar a suit from 
being brought against an allegedly fraudulent contractor.53   
The 2009 and 2010 amendments further increased the power of the 
FCA.54  These amendments, combined with the amendment of 1986, 
turned the FCA into one of the most overpowered statutory weapons at the 
federal government’s disposal.55  The FCA now covers virtually all 
transactions between the federal government and independent 
contractors.56  More so, the Supreme Court further strengthened the FCA 
by validating the implied false certification theory in Escobar—creating yet 
another avenue for a company to accrue FCA liability.57 
III.    THE ESCOBAR DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S MATERIALITY ELEMENT 
In 2016, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of the implied false 
certification theory by validating the doctrine in its landmark opinion in 
Escobar.58  This decision was highly important for two significant reasons.  
First, the Escobar decision ended a long-standing split among the federal 
circuit courts regarding the validity of implied false certification  
 
52. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986); False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 
100 Stat. 3153 (1986); see Martin, Jr., supra note 45, at 237 (discussing how the 1986 amendment to the 
FCA expanded the Act’s power).  
53. Martin, Jr., supra note 45, at 237; S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986). 
54. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see Howell, 
supra note 48, at 100 (discussing how the FCA was expanded by the 1986, 2009, and 2010 
amendments). 
55. See Howell, supra note 48, at 100 (explaining the power’s granted to the FCA by the 1986, 
2009, and 2010 amendments). 
56. See generally The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 22, 2011), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/K84R-ETLP] (stating FCA liability accrues for anyone “who knowingly submits a false 
claim to the government or causes another to submit a false claim to the government or knowingly 
makes a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the government”). 
57. See Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) 
(holding, under certain circumstances, cases may be filed using the implied certification theory under 
the FCA). 
58. Id. at 1999. 
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theory.59  Second, and the main focus of this Comment, the Escobar decision 
created even more confusion between the circuit courts regarding the issue 
of a claim’s materiality.60  This section will begin with a brief discussion of 
how the Supreme Court ended the circuit splits regarding the implied false 
certification theory.  This section will then focus on how the materiality 
standard proffered by the Escobar Court impacted the circuit courts’ rulings 
on FCA cases. 
A. Ending the Circuit Court’s Confusion with the Escobar Decision 
Before the Escobar decision, federal circuits debated the validity and scope 
of the implied false certification theory.61  This theory allows the 
government or a whistleblower to bring a complaint under the FCA when a 
contractor makes a claim for payment, but does not disclose any violations 
of contractual obligations or statutory regulations that are implied and 
material to the government’s payment.62  The circuit split prior to Escobar 
was not a simple cut-and-dry split between two circuits; the implied false 
certification theory split was between virtually all the circuits.63  Some 
circuits recognized the theory in full, some only in part or only in certain 
circumstances, and one outright denied the theory’s viability.64  Due to 
widespread confusion about the implied false certification theory among the 
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Escobar case.65   
In Escobar, the dispute hinged on two issues: (1) whether a claim under 
the FCA could be made using the implied false certification theory, and 
 
59. Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False Certification to Materiality Under the False Claims 
Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 273, 280–83 (2019) (discussing the split between the varying 
circuits regarding on the implied false certification theory and how the Escobar decision resolved the 
split). 
60. See Bergman, supra note 4 (noting the circuit courts are not consistent in their rulings 
regarding materiality of an FCA claim since the Escobar decision). 
61. See Latoya C. Dawkins, Not So Fast: Proving Implied False Certification Theory Post-Escobar, 
42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 165 (2017) (discussing in brief how the circuits were split on implied 
false certification theory). 
62. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (stating how the misrepresentation made by a defendant falls 
within the definition of “false and fraudulent” in this explained situation). 
63. See Megan E. Italiano, Note, An Implied Defense: Self-Disclosure Offers A Defense to the Expanded 
False Claims Liability After Universal Health Services v. Escobar, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1943,  
1951–55 (2019) (noting the history of implied false certification theory and how the theory varied from 
circuit to circuit); see also Krause, supra note 26, at 1820–21 (discussing the split among the circuits about 
the validity and scope of the implied false certification theory of the FCA). 
64. See Krause, supra note 26, at 1820–21 (summarizing the circuit split regarding implied false 
certification theory).  
65. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998. 
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(2) whether FCA liability could only accrue if an express payment provision 
is violated.66  The relators who brought the case alleged that Universal 
Health Services violated the FCA under the implied false certification 
theory.67  Specifically, the relators alleged that Universal Health Services did 
not disclose that some of its employees lacked the proper medical training 
and licensing required by Medicaid when the company submitted claims for 
payment.68   
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
granted summary judgment for Universal Health Services, holding none of 
the statutory regulations the company violated were conditions of 
payment.69  The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, taking the position 
that statutory or contractual regulations could be either expressly stated 
conditions of payment or implied conditions of payment.70  Upon Universal 
Health Services’ appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to end the 
conflict among the circuits regarding the validity of the implied false 
certification theory.71   
The Court held a claim could be brought under the FCA, in select 
instances, using the implied false certification theory.72  The Court also 
concluded not all conditions for payment are expressly stated. 73  There may 
be some implied conditions, and violating implied conditions of payment 
can trigger liability under the FCA.74  However, the Court carefully noted 
that not all violations of even an express condition of payment can trigger 
FCA liability.75  According to the Court, what triggered liability under the 
FCA was not a violation of just any old contractual provision or statutory 
 
66. See id. at 1995–96 (explaining how claims can be made under the FCA using the implied 
false certification theory in some circumstances, and FCA liability is not limited to circumstances where 
there is a violation of express conditions for payment). 
67. Id. at 1997–98. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1998. 
70. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d 504, 512–13 (1st Cir. 
2015). 
71. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998–99 (discussing the Court’s reasoning for granting certiorari). 
72. See id. at 1999 (holding implied false certification theory is a valid theory under which to 
bring a claim under the FCA). 
73. Id. at 2001. 
74. See id. (holding the FCA does not limit liability to violations of express conditions for 
payment only). 
75. See id. (noting not all violations of express conditions will automatically trigger liability under 
the FCA). 
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regulation.76  Rather, what triggers FCA liability is whether the violated 
provision or regulation was material to the government’s decision to pay the 
contractor.77 
The Court reasoned that focusing on whether or not a violated provision 
or regulation was material to the government’s decision to pay a contractor 
was the most efficient and effective method to adjudicate FCA claims.78  
The Court wanted to prevent mass confusion among government 
contractors, who are desperately trying to abide by both express contractual 
conditions of payment and implied statutory conditions in order to avoid 
liability.79  Furthermore, the Court wanted to avoid providing an avenue for 
the federal government to turn every mere contractual violation or 
inconsequential statutory violation into an FCA issue by labeling anything 
and everything as a condition of payment.80  Thus, for FCA liability to be 
triggered, a government contractor must violate an obligation or regulation 
that is material to the government’s decision to pay.81  As Justice Thomas 
wrote:  
If the Government failed to specify that guns it orders must actually shoot, 
but the defendant knows that the Government routinely rescinds contracts if 
the guns do not shoot, the defendant has “actual knowledge.” . . . [A] 
defendant’s failure to appreciate the materiality of that condition would 
amount to “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the “truth or 
falsity of the information” even if the Government did not spell this out.82   
The Court’s decision allowing claims to be brought under the FCA by the 
implied false certification theory in limited circumstances cleared up the 
 
76. See id. (stating materiality is key to determining whether a provision or regulation is a 
condition of payment). 
77. See id. (determining materiality to be a key factor in determining whether a contractor 
actually violated the FCA). 
78. See id. (noting a condition of payment is determined by a materiality determination). 
79. See id. at 2002 (discussing the complicated web of contractual obligations and statutory 
regulations that companies must deal with in order to do business with the government). 
80. See id. (explaining the need to avoid having the government label everything contractual 
obligation or statutory regulation an express condition of payment). 
81. See id. (holding a material obligation or regulation must be violated to the decision for the 
government to pay). 
82. See id. at 2001–02 (providing Justice Thomas’s example of unshootable guns and the ability 
for the government to rescind such contracts for the knowledge that the contractor has of this material 
issue). 
12
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 6
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/6
  
2021] COMMENT 605 
mass circuit confusion regarding the theory.83  However, the Court’s 
decision in Escobar would again cause as much confusion among the federal 
circuits as did the validity and scope of implied false certification theory.84  
Only this time, the confusion stemmed from the Escobar Court’s own 
materiality standard.85 
B. The Escobar Decision’s Impact on Materiality of an FCA Claim 
The Supreme Court ended one mass circuit split with its decision in 
Escobar, but created a new one regarding the issue of materiality.86  In 
Escobar, the Court stated the materiality standard of the FCA was 
“demanding.”87  In the years since the Court’s decision in Escobar, the 
federal circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
position on the materiality element of an FCA claim.88  In particular, the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits are the most at odds with one another regarding 
this issue.89 
As previously stated, the Supreme Court determined the materiality 
 
 
83. See Tiphanie Miller, Materiality and the False Claims Act After Escobar, 35 DEL. LAW., Spring 
2017, at 24, 25 (discussing briefly why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Escobar and the Court’s 
holding stating the implied false certification theory is valid). 
84. See Bergman, supra note 4 (stating the circuit courts have struggled to come to a consensus 
on an interpretation of Escobar’s materiality standard); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing how 
three years after the decision, the circuit courts are still divided regarding Escobar’s materiality standard); 
Roderick L. Thomas & Michelle B. Bradshaw, False Claims Act: Escobar’s Materiality Language Gets More 
Bite, WILEY (Nov. 2017) https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-False-Claims-Act-
Escobars-Materiality-Language-Gets-More-Bite.html [https://perma.cc/RL9C-WYZE] (discussing 
how courts grapple with how to properly apply Escobar’s materiality standard). 
85. See Mike Chow, Note, Payment Is Not Enough: Materiality in Implied False Certifications Under the 
False Claims Act, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 576 (2019) (noting how the Escobar Court ended the circuit 
split regarding implied false claims theory, but created another one based on its very own holding on 
materiality). 
86. See Bergman, supra note 4 (stating courts are divided in interpreting the Supreme Court’s 
holding on materiality of a claim made under the FCA); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (“The high court’s 
refusal to further detail what a valid complaint must say to sufficiently allege falsity and materiality, . . . 
arguably leaves two significant federal circuit splits in place on those issues.”). 
87. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016) 
(“The materiality standard is demanding.”). 
88. See Farringer, supra note 20, at 1254 (explaining how the lower courts have trouble in 
interpreting the materiality standard the Supreme Court set out in Escobar); see also Boyadzieva, supra 
note 8, at 13 (discussing how the Supreme Court in Escobar did not lay out a bright line rule regarding 
materiality of an FCA claim). 
89. See Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the existence of a circuit split between the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits surrounding the issue of materiality of FCA claims post-Escobar). 
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standard of an FCA claim to be “demanding.”90  The Court laid out some 
guidelines to help explain just how demanding the materiality standard is.91  
However, these guidelines were not bright-line rules, leading to variations in 
circuit court interpretations.  Currently, the materiality standard requires an 
intensive examination of the facts involved in each complaint, and no one 
factor is completely dispositive in the determination process.92 
In Escobar, the Court observed that the FCA requires a contractor’s 
misrepresentation or fraud to be “material to the other party’s course of 
action.”93  To make this determination, the Court—as one should—first 
looked to the FCA’s definition of materiality.94  The statute defines 
materiality as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of 
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”95  The Court 
noted this definition was rooted in common law traditions.96  The Court 
pointed out, across various rulings, there could be no existence of fraud 
where the fraud was not material to induce a party to act.97   
However, the Court declined to specifically establish whether the FCA is 
directly governed by § 3729(b)(4)—the statute’s actual definition of 
materiality—or if common law traditions govern the statute.98  Today, clear 
direction on the materiality aspect of an FCA claim would be very beneficial 
for both the courts adjudicating FCA cases and businesses that regularly 
contract with the government.99  Nevertheless, the Escobar Court decided 
in its wisdom to not establish a bright-line rule just yet.  Instead, it attempted 
to take a middle path to the concept of materiality.100  The Court reiterated 
 
90. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (describing the materiality standard of an FCA claim as 
“demanding”). 
91. See id. at 2001–04 (discussing the materiality standard of an FCA claim). 
92. See Miller, supra note 83, at 25 (describing the materiality standard as set down in the Escobar 
decision). 
93. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001 (explaining the materiality standard of an FCA claim). 
94. See id. at 2002 (noting the definition of materiality in the FCA).  
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2018). 
96. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999)) 
(providing the Court preserved the common law meaning of materiality in various rulings regarding 
fraud and misrepresentation). 
97. See id. (stating the Court preserved the common law meaning of materiality in various rulings 
regarding fraud and misrepresentation). 
98. Id. 
99. See generally Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing the existence of a circuit split regarding the 
Escobar materiality standard, and discussing how the business community would like some clear 
direction on the issue as well). 
100. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (discussing why the Court was not establishing whether 
common law or the FCA’s direct definition govern the materiality of an FCA claim). 
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that materiality is determined by the misrepresentation of a party’s decision 
to pay and such a position on materiality was held across varying areas of 
law.101 
The Court continued to expound its position on materiality by laying out 
some base guidelines for the lower courts to follow.  First, the government 
cannot just label any “statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a 
condition of payment.”102  Next, the Court stated that an FCA claim lacks 
materiality even if the government might have an option to not pay a 
contractor upon learning of an instance of noncompliance.103  The Court 
further noted that if a contractor’s noncompliance was “minor or 
insubstantial,” then the noncompliance was also not material.104  Just 
because the government claims something is material to its decision to pay 
does not mean that it is necessarily so.  The Court pointed out that, though 
not dispositive, the government’s identification of a provision as a condition 
of payment is highly relevant to a materiality determination.105   
The Court then discussed what would be material in a claim made under 
the FCA.  The materiality of an FCA claim, according to the Court, includes 
situations where a contractor knows the government never pays when a 
specific statute or contractual obligation is violated.106  For example, a 
company contracts with the federal government to provide gently 
used,  pre-owned vehicles for government agencies.  The company knows 
the federal government never pays on these contracts when a licensed 
mechanic does not service the used vehicles.  However, the company merely 
hires self-taught mechanics to work on the vehicles.  When the company 
delivers the vehicles and requests payment from the federal government, the 
company’s omission that non-licensed mechanics worked on the vehicles 
instead of licensed ones would be material in determining of liability under 
the FCA. 
Notably, the Court did include a knowledge limitation on the government 
regarding the materiality of an FCA claim.  In instances where the 
government actually knows about a contractor’s noncompliance and pays 
 
101. See id. at 2002–03 (evidencing a similar position taken by both the Restatement of 
Contracts and the Restatement of Torts). 
102. Id. at 2003. 
103. See id. (discussing the Court’s position on materiality). 
104. Id. 
105. See id. (noting the government’s position that a statute or contractual regulation as a 
condition of payment is not automatically dispositive). 
106. Id. 
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the contractor in full for their work, said knowledge provides a strong 
presumption that the noncompliance was not material to the government’s 
decision to pay.107  Furthermore, if the government typically pays on certain 
contracts despite its knowledge of noncompliance, such payment also 
provides a strong presumption that the noncompliance was immaterial to 
the government’s decision to pay.108   
However, the Court, continuing down its middle road position, did not 
provide this knowledge limitation with a very powerful bite.109  This is 
because, although the government’s decision to pay or continue to pay a 
contractor despite the government’s knowledge of noncompliance is strong 
evidence that the noncompliance is immaterial, that evidence is not 
completely dispositive.110  In other words, even though the government 
completely knows about a contractor’s noncompliance and still pays the 
contractor in full—which would imply to a reasonable person that the 
noncompliance was immaterial—a court could still determine that the 
contractor’s noncompliance was indeed material.  Thus, a court could 
impose FCA liability on a company the government’s knowledge about the 
company’s noncompliance and payment to the company.  This stance seems 
self-contradictory.  However, attempting to maintain common law 
traditions, the Court did not directly establish any of the materiality factors 
set out in Escobar as bright-line rules.111 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to establish any bright-line rules regarding 
the issue of materiality of an FCA claim caused variances in the circuit 
courts’ decisions on FCA cases in the three years since the Escobar 
decision.112  Nearly every circuit has a different stance on the materiality of 
a claim made under the FCA, and thus there is no clear consensus 
throughout the country on what is and what is not material in an FCA 
 
107. See id. (stating the government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and the 
government’s decision to pay provides a presumption of the noncompliance’s non-materiality). 
108. Id. at 2003–04. 
109. See id. (providing the government’s actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance can 
show that the noncompliance was immaterial).  
110. See id. (noting the government’s actual knowledge is not completely dispositive in a 
materiality determination of an FCA claim). 
111. See id. at 2002–04 (stating common law traditions do influence a materiality analysis of an 
FCA materiality claim, but not directly deciding whether it governs, and stating factors courts could 
use to analyze the materiality element). 
112. See Chow, supra note 85, at 576 (stating the Supreme Court set the stage for new circuit 
splits involving materiality when it implied false certification theory). 
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claim.113  In particular, the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have the most 
comprehensive split on the issue.114  So, in sum, the Escobar decision’s 
impact on the issue of materiality of an FCA claim was a negative one that 
caused confusion between the circuit courts and for the business that 
regularly contracts with the government.115  This confusion has led both 
businesses and attorneys alike to call for some bright-line rules to guide their 
understanding of the FCA.116  To date, the Supreme Court has been deaf 
to these calls.117 
IV.    THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S STRICT POSITION ON MATERIALITY AND 
SIMILAR STRICT POSITIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS 
Since Escobar, the federal circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted  
the Supreme Court’s materiality factors of an FCA claim.118  Some circuits, 
such as the Fifth Circuit, have strictly interpreted one facet of the Court’s 
position on materiality, while others, such as the Ninth Circuit,  
interpret this facet of the Court’s position more loosely.119  Specifically, 
when it is shown that the government had actual knowledge of alleged 
noncompliance and continued to pay or paid the defendant in  
full, that evidence overwhelmingly, not just strongly, shows that 
noncompliance was immaterial.120  The Fifth Circuit promulgated this 
reasonable avenue of a potential bright-line rule for materiality in FCA 
claims.  This reasonable avenue of a potential bright-line rule for materiality 
in FCA claims was promulgated by the Fifth Circuit after Escobar was  
 
113. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing “there appears to be a deepening circuit split 
developing regarding how plaintiffs must plead and prove materiality after Escobar”). 
114. Seiden, supra note 31. 
115. See id. (noting the existence of a clear circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
surrounding the issue of materiality of FCA claims post-Escobar). 
116. See id. (interviewing Robert Rhoad about the current state of the FCA). 
117. See id. (providing illustrating how the Supreme Court again rejected to hear cases regarding 
the FCA’s materiality standard). 
118. See Alex Hontos & Lauren Roso, False Claims Act: New Developments for an Old Law, DORSEY 
& WHITENY LLP (Aug. 23, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://dorseyfca.com/false-claims-act-new-
developments-for-an-old-law/ [https://perma.cc/6SW5-9GD8] (discussing the lack of Supreme 
Court guidance about the materiality of an FCA claim post-Escobar). 
119. See Jacklyn N. DeMar, From the Editor, 87 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. NL 1, 
1 (2017) (discussing the differing interpretations of the Supreme Court’s materiality holding in Escobar 
held by the circuit courts). 
120. See id. at 1 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of an FCA claim when the government 
had actual knowledge of noncompliance and continued payment despite noncompliance). 
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decided.121  The Fifth Circuit’s position on materiality of an FCA claim’s 
materiality is echoed by several other circuits, which in turn created a split 
among the circuits taking a strict position and the Ninth Circuit’s more 
relaxed position on the materiality of an FCA claim.122 
This section will first discuss the Fifth Circuit’s position regarding FCA 
claims, where the government had actual knowledge of an alleged 
noncompliance and yet continued to pay or paid the contractor despite this 
knowledge.  Specifically, this section will look at two cases from the 
Fifth Circuit—Abbot v. BP Exploration & Production,123 and United States ex 
rel. Harman v. Trinity Industries,124 respectively.  Next, this section will discuss 
other federal circuit courts that have taken a similarly strict stance to the 
Supreme Court’s materiality holding from Escobar.125  Specifically, it will 
examine cases from the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits and discuss how 
the position of these circuits’ position is similar to that of the 
Fifth Circuit.126 
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Strict Position on Materiality 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar, the Fifth Circuit 
was presented with two cases involving the FCA.  First in Abbott, and then 
more conclusively in Harman, the Fifth Circuit held in favor of an allegedly 
fraudulent contractor when the government had actual knowledge of the 
contractor’s noncompliance and continued to pay the contractor.127  These 




121. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 663 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(drawing the lesson that “continued payment by the federal government after it learns of the alleged 
fraud substantially increases the burden on the relator in establishing materiality”). 
122. See Bergman, supra note 4 (discussing the continuing circuit split stemming from Escobar’s 
materiality holding); see also Seiden, supra note 31 (noting the continuance of a circuit split regarding 
materiality three years after the Escobar decision).  
123. Abbott v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017). 
124. Harman, 872 F.3d at 645. 
125. Bergman, supra note 4.  
126. Id.  
127. See Harman 872 F.3d at 667–68 (holding in favor of Trinity Industries due to a lack of 
materiality in the whistleblower’s FCA claim because the government had actual knowledge of Trinity’s 
noncompliance and continued to use Trinity’s products and pay Trinity); see also Abbott, 851 F.3d at 388 
(holding in favor of BP because of a lack of materiality in the whistleblower’s FCA claim due to the 
government’s knowledge of BP alleged noncompliance and continued payment to BP). 
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FCA’s demanding materiality standard.128   
In Abbott, a whistleblower brought a case against British Petroleum (BP), 
claiming BP made false assertions of compliance with regulatory 
requirements to the United States Department of the Interior (DOI).129  
The whistleblower claimed BP did not possess all the government-required 
documentation and engineer approval for its operation of an oil production 
facility in the Gulf of Mexico.130  The whistleblower alerted the DOI of 
BP’s potential fraud, which prompted the DOI to investigate the 
allegations.131  Upon completing its investigation, the DOI deemed the 
whistleblower’s complaint to lack merit and declined to revoke BP’s license 
to operate the oil production facility.132  The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas upheld BP’s motion to dismiss after 
initially denying the motion pre-discovery, and the whistleblower 
appealed.133 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on the materiality of the 
claim.134  The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court’s declaration that 
the FCA’s materiality standard is demanding.135  Furthermore, case’s facts 
drew the Fifth Circuit’s attention to the Escobar Court’s statements regarding 
instances when the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s 
 
128. See Harman, 872 F.3d at 660–61 (noting the Supreme Court stated the materiality standard 
of an FCA case is demanding and to look at the government’s actual knowledge and behavior in 
determining materiality); see also Abbott, 851 F.3d at 388 (noting the Escobar decision described the 
government’s actual knowledge and continued payment to an allegedly fraudulent contractor as 
substantial evidence that the noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay). 
129. See Abbot, 851 F.3d at 386 (“Abbott subsequently filed . . . a complaint pursuant to 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) on April 21, 2009, claiming, inter alia, that BP 
falsely certified compliance with various regulatory requirements.”). 
130. Id. at 386 (“During his employment, Abbott came to believe that BP did not have all of 
the necessary documentation for the Atlantis and that many of the Atlantis documents that BP did 
have were not approved by engineers as required by applicable regulations.”). 
131. See id. (“As a result of his lawsuit, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) began reviewing 
BP’s compliance with those regulatory requirements in May 2009.”). 
132. See id. (“DOI’s investigation culminated in a 2011 report . . . that concluded that ‘Abbott’s 
allegations that Atlantis operations personnel lacked access to critical, engineer-approved drawings are 
without merit,’ and that ‘Abbott’s allegations about false submissions by BP to [DOI] are unfounded.”). 
133. See id. (“The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of BP on all 
claims.”). 
134. See id. at 387–88 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding on materiality in Escobar). 
135. See id. (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 2001 (2016)). 
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noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor.136  In this case, the 
DOI knew of BP’s noncompliance with certain regulations.137  Despite this 
knowledge, the DOI found no reason to suspend or terminate BP’s 
operation of the oil production facility operation.138  The Fifth Circuit 
rightfully observed how these facts presented strong evidence BP allegedly 
violated the regulations was immaterial to the government’s decision to 
allow BP to continue operations.139  Thus, the whistleblower’s complaint 
did not meet the demanding materiality standard Escobar imposed, and the 
district court did not err in granting summary judgment for BP.140 
The Fifth Circuit’s ruling on the materiality issue in Abbott’s materiality 
issue seems to be a strict, textualist interpretation of the materiality standard 
set out in Escobar.141  The Fifth Circuit continued to strictly interpret the 
Supreme Court’s stance on materiality in its decision in Harman, when that 
case was brought before it several months after deciding Abbott.142  The 
Harman decision clarified and firmly set the Fifth Circuit’s position on the 
materiality of FCA claims when the government has actual knowledge of 




136. See id. at 387–88 (noting the Supreme Court stated the government’s actual knowledge of 
noncompliance and the government’s continued payment despite of this knowledge presents a strong 
showing that the noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s payment). 
137. See id. at 386 (describing how the whistleblower’s complaint triggered an investigation of 
the allegations by the DOI allegations). 
138. See id. (“The DOI Report also ‘found no grounds for suspending the operations of the 
Atlantis . . . or revoking BP’s designation as an operator . . . .’”). 
139. See id. at 388 (noting the DOI’s knowledge of BP’s noncompliance with certain regulations 
and its immateriality in the DOI’s decision to allow BP to continue operations). 
140. See id. (“The district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on the FCA 
claims in favor of BP.”). 
141. Compare Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (finding it to be strong evidence that a violation 
was immaterial to the government’s payment decision when the government continued to pay an 
allegedly fraudulent contractor despite having actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation), with 
Abbott 851 F.3d at 387–88 (stating the DOI’s knowledge of BP’s noncompliance with certain 
regulatory statutes combined with the DOI’s decision to allow BP to continue operating in the Gulf 
of Mexico created a substantial showing of evidence that compliance with those statutes was not 
material in the DOI’s decision, and the whistleblower had no evidence to beat this substantial 
evidence). 
142. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–61 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(explaining the Supreme Court’s position on the materiality of FCA claims as laid out in Escobar). 
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noncompliance.143  In these instances, claims fail for lack of materiality.144 
In Harman, a whistleblower brought an FCA claim against Trinity 
Industries Inc. (Trinity), a manufacturer of highway guardrails for sale and 
use by state governments throughout the United States.145  Since the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) reimbursed the states which 
purchased Trinity’s guardrails, Trinity was in effect paid by the federal 
government and, thus, fell within the scope of the FCA.146  The 
whistleblower, a customer and former competitor, alleged Trinity did not 
inform the FHWA of some changes made to the guardrails and these 
changes led to an increase in car accidents.147  In other words, the 
whistleblower claimed that Trinity defrauded the federal government of 
funds.148   
The FHWA investigated the whistleblower’s allegations.149  Following 
the investigation, the FHWA stated, despite Trinity’s omission of the 
changes it made to the guardrails, it would continue to reimburse states 
which purchased these products.150  Furthermore, the government declined 
to intervene in the case, leaving the whistleblower to continue the litigation 
on its behalf.151  Based on the FHWA’s investigation and decision to 
continue payment, and because the government would not prosecute the 
case itself, Trinity moved for summary judgment.152  The district court 
denied this motion, as well as a writ of mandamus following a mistrial.153  
Interestingly, though the district court stated it was not prepared to make a 
ruling as a matter of law, the court did note the evidence substantially did 
 
143. See id. at 663–65 (holding the whistleblower’s claim failed for lack of materiality in this case 
because the government knew about the alleged noncompliance and still reimbursed the contractor 
despite this knowledge). 
144. See United States ex rel. Patel v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 312 F. Supp. 3d 584, 605 
(S.D. Tex. 2018) (determining an FCA complaint to lack materiality when the government would have 
the option to decline payment when it knew of the contractor’s noncompliance based on the Escobar 
materiality standard and the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Harman). 
145. Harman, 872 F.3d at 649–50. 
146. Id. at 648. 
147. Id. at 649–50. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 650. 
150. Id.  
151. Id.  
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 650–51. 
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allude to immateriality of Trinity’s omission.154  However, the jury did not 
see it that way and rendered a verdict in favor of the whistleblower.155 
Following the verdict, the FHWA ordered independent testing of the 
guardrails.156  When the results of the testing the guardrails were safe, the 
FHWA stated it would continue to reimburse states for purchasing them.157  
Based upon the independent testing and the FHWA’s announcement, 
Trinity sought post-judgment relief, but was denied by the district court.158  
Trinity then appealed to the Fifth Circuit seeking the post-judgment relief 
denied to it by the district court.159 
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not grant Trinity its sought-after post-
judgment relief.160  Instead, it reversed the whole decision.161  The 
Fifth Circuit interpreted the facts of the case to show that the 
whistleblower’s claim did not meet the materiality standard set out in 
Escobar.162  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit focused on the government’s 
actual knowledge and actual behavior based on this knowledge.163  In other 
words, because the FHWA knew about Trinity’s omission of the changes 
made to its highway guardrails, and continued to reimburse states for 
purchasing the guardrails, Trinity’s omission was immaterial to the FHWA’s 
decision to pay.164 
The Fifth Circuit reached its decision by not only strictly interpreting 
Escobar’s materiality standard, but also by examining similar cases from other 
federal circuits.165  The Fifth Circuit even examined the position of the 
Ninth Circuit—which did not immediately find a lack of materiality in these 
 
154. See id. at 651 (referencing the district court reprimanding the parties for the mistrial and 
stating, “a strong argument can be made that the defendant’s actions were neither material nor were 
any false claims based on false certifications presented to the government”). 
155. Id. at 651. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. at 651 (5th Cir. 2017). 
158. Id. at 651–52. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 652 (“[W]e need not consider the question of post-judgment relief . . . .”). 
161. See id. at 652, 670 (finding Trinity to be “entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue 
of materiality,” and reversing and remanding the case in favor of Trinity). 
162. See id. at 660–62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding on materiality of FCA claims in 
the Escobar decision). 
163. See id. at 663–67 (examining the FHWA’s decision to continue to reimburse states for use 
of Trinity’s guardrails, despite the FHWA’s actual knowledge of Trinity’s omission). 
164. See id. at 665 (“[T]he ‘very strong evidence’ here of FHWA’s continued payment remains 
unrebutted.”). 
165. See id. at 661–63 (examining FCA cases involving similar situations from the First, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits). 
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instances—but found its sister-circuit’s interpretation to be 
unpersuasive.166  The Fifth Circuit determined, though these circuits did 
not hold any one materiality factor to be dispositive, several circuits held 
that when the government continues to pay a contractor despite an issue of 
noncompliance it is very strong evidence that the noncompliance is 
immaterial.167   
To date, the Fifth Circuit has yet to take another case involving the FCA’s 
materiality standard when the government has actual knowledge of a 
noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor.168  So, as it stands, the 
Fifth Circuit’s position regarding materiality of an FCA claim is a showing 
by the defendant of the government’s actual knowledge of an alleged 
noncompliance and its continued payment in spite of this knowledge creates 
a virtually insurmountable burden for the plaintiff.169  This burden is so 
substantial that it, in effect, defeats the materiality element of an FCA 
claim.170 
Furthermore, this substantial burden for the plaintiff only occurs in 
instances when the government has actual knowledge and has made 
payments or paid in full.171  In any other scenario, such as when the 
government stops payment when it gains the required knowledge or does 
not gain actual knowledge of the alleged noncompliance, the FCA claim is 
 
166. See id. at 664–68 (determining the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Escobar materiality 
standard to be unpersuasive). 
167. See id. at 661–63 (explaining how the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits provided the 
Fifth Circuit with the lesson that continued payment by the government after it learns of a contractor’s 
noncompliance is highly strong evidence of the noncompliance’s immateriality and that said evidence 
had not been rebutted in this case). 
168. See Taylor Sample, With Widening Circuit Splits and Mounting Pressure Will 2019 See a Post-
Escobar Decision from the Supreme Court, JD SUPRA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/with-widening-circuit-splits-and-33647/ [https://perma.cc/ZPZ5-LT2R] (pointing out 
how the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for the Harman case leaves as precedent the Fifth Circuit’s 
position on materiality of an FCA claim when the government has knowledge of the alleged 
noncompliance and continues to pay or pays the contract in full). 
169. Id.  
170. See id. at 665 (discussing how the plaintiff’s complaint should fail for lack of materiality 
because of the strong evidence of the government’s knowledge of the noncompliance and its continued 
reimbursement for states that used Trinity’s guardrails). 
171. Compare United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 161–62 (5th Cir. 
2019) (determining an FCA claim to meet the Escobar material standard because the government did 
not have actual knowledge of the alleged noncompliance when it made payments to the contractor), 
with Harman, 872 F.3d 645, 665 (5th Cir. 2017) (determining the evidence of a complaint’s immateriality 
to be virtually insurmountable when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged 
noncompliance and pays the contractor in full or continues to make payments). 
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not so easily defeated for lack of materiality.172  The specific required 
circumstances that would trigger this heavy burden on the plaintiff are 
limited—the government must pay with full knowledge of the alleged fraud 
that is actually occurring.173  Thus, this limitation makes it very difficult for 
businesses to abuse the Fifth Circuit’s FCA materiality position, and makes 
the position an efficient and effective method to quickly and reasonably end 
an FCA dispute.174 
B. Similar Strict Positions of Other Federal Circuit Courts 
A few other federal circuit courts hold a similar position to that of the 
Fifth Circuit regarding the immateriality of an FCA complaint when the 
government actually knows of an alleged noncompliance and continues to 
make payments on a contract.175  Most notably, the First, Third, and 
Seventh Circuits virtually mirror the position of the Fifth Circuit.176  Those 
circuit courts, like the Fifth Circuit, strictly interpret the Escobar Court’s 
materiality guidelines, and in doing so highlight the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such an interpretation on FCA cases.177 
1. The First Circuit’s Position 
The First Circuit, in United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,178 
held akin to the Fifth Circuit when it encountered a case in which the 
government had actual knowledge of noncompliance and still reimbursed a 
contractor.179  Nargol involved alleged Medicare fraud based on a 
contractor’s omission of potential design flaws in metal hip 
replacements.180  However, the government continued approving the 
designs and purchasing the metal hip replacements despite learning of these 
 
172. See United States ex rel. Broadnax v. Sand Lake Ctr., P.A., No. 8:13-cv-2724-T-27MAP, slip 
op. at *5  (M.D. Fla. Feb. 04, 2019) (limiting Harman to instances where the government has actual 
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor or pays the contractor 
in full despite this actual knowledge). 
173. See id. at *4–5 (noting the circumstances when the Harman precedent would be triggered). 
174. Id. at 5. 
175. See Bergman, supra note 4 (listing and summarizing the differing federal circuit court 
positions on the materiality of an FCA complaint). 
176. Id.  
177. Id. 
178. United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 865 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2017). 
179. See id. at 35–37 (determining the whistleblower’s complaint did not meet the FCA’s 
demanding materiality standard as set out by the Escobar Court). 
180. Id. at 31–34. 
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potential flaws from the whistleblower.181  The United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts ruled for the defendant, leading to the 
whistleblower’s appeal.182   
The First Circuit took note of the Escobar Court’s determination that the 
FCA’s materiality standard is demanding.183  The First Circuit specifically 
looked to the factor stating that when the government has actual knowledge 
of an alleged contractual violation and yet continues to pay on the contract, 
then the government’s knowledge is strong evidence of the violation’s 
immateriality to the government’s decision to pay.184  The record in Nargol 
presented the First Circuit with evidence that the government gained actual 
knowledge of the defendant’s alleged violation, but did not withdraw 
approval of or cease reimbursement for the defendant’s metal hip 
replacements.185  To the First Circuit, because the government did not 
change its position once learning of the defendant’s alleged violations, it was 
evidence that the alleged violations were immaterial to the government’s 
decision to pay.186  In the end, the First Circuit dismissed all but one of the 
whistleblower’s complaints because it found the misstatements in these 
dismissed complaints to be immaterial to the government’s decision to pay 
due to the government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violations.187 
2. The Third Circuit’s Position 
The Third Circuit holding in United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genetech Inc.,188 
was similar to the First Circuit’s position.189  In Petratos, the whistleblower 
alleged Genentech committed fraud under the FCA by omitting some 
potential side effects of a cancer drug in its submissions for Medicare 
 
181. See id. at 35 (noting how the record showed the FDA continued to reimburse healthcare 
providers who purchased and used the defendant’s products, after the FDA learned of the alleged 
violations). 
182. Id. at 34. 
183. Id. at 34–35.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 35. 
186. See id. at 35–36 (noting the Escobar materiality factors and the evidence of the government 
maintaining its normal position with the defendant after learning of the alleged violations). 
187. See id. at 36, 43 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of all but one of the whistleblower’s 
complaints because they could not meet the exacting standards of a complaint made under the FCA). 
188. United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017). 
189. See id. at 490–93 (holding the whistleblower’s complaint to lack the materiality element 
required of an FCA complaint due to evidence of the FDA’s continued approval of Genentech’s cancer 
drug for reimbursement). 
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reimbursements.190  The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey first held that the whistleblower’s claim failed because the claim 
could not meet the falsity element of an FCA.191  Predictably, the 
whistleblower appealed but the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.192  
However, the Third Circuit did not affirm the ruling based on the district 
court’s reasoning.193  Rather than deciding this case by looking at the falsity 
element, the Third Circuit determined that the complaint did not meet the 
FCA’s demanding materiality standard.194 
In Petratos, the Third Circuit examined the record under the lenses of the 
FCA’s demanding materiality standard.195  The Third Circuit specifically 
noted that it is strong evidence of immateriality when the government 
continues payment regardless of having actual knowledge of a 
noncompliance.196  Interestingly, the Third Circuit interpreted this 
materiality factor to also mean an omission was immaterial to the 
government’s payment decision when a relator admits the “[g]overnment 
would have paid the claims with full knowledge of the alleged 
noncompliance.”197  The Third Circuit even posited that if a relator did not 
plead that the government’s actual knowledge of the noncompliance would 
influence its decision to pay, then the alleged noncompliance was immaterial 
as well.198 
3. The Seventh Circuit’s Position 




190. Id. at 485. 
191. Id. at 486. 
192. Id. at 494.  
193. See id. at 489 (describing how appellate courts may affirm a case based upon reasoning 
different than that of the district court and affirming the district court’s decision because the claim did 
not meet the demanding materiality requirement of an FCA complaint). 
194. Id.  
195. See id. at 489–90 (examining the case record based on Escobar materiality). 
196. See id. at 481, 489 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors). 
197. Id. at 481–90.  
198. See id. at 490 (noting the Third Circuit’s belief that the FCA’s demanding materiality 
standard should be implemented at the pleading stage and highlighting how the federal circuit courts 
are becoming split on whether to implement the FCA’s demanding materiality standard at the pleading 
or trial stages of an action—which provides the basis of this argument for the bright-line rule to 
implemented at the trial stage). 
199. United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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also brought the Seventh Circuit to a similar position.200  Sanford-Brown was 
originally decided in 2015 by the Seventh Circuit in favor of the defendant, 
because the complaint was made utilizing the implied false certification 
theory, which the Seventh Circuit did not recognize at the time.201  
Granting the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court took the case.202  But, 
the Court quickly remanded Sanford-Brown back to the Seventh Circuit, 
having ruled on a similar issue in the Escobar decision just eleven days 
prior.203  On remand, however, the Seventh Circuit again held for the 
defendant.204 
The Seventh Circuit reached its final decision in Sanford-Brown based on 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar.205  The Seventh Circuit first 
determined that the relator did not present a proper FCA complaint under 
implied false certification theory.206  More importantly though, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that because the government—even with 
knowledge of the alleged noncompliance—continued to do business with 
the defendant, the alleged noncompliance was immaterial to the 
government’s decision to make payments.207  According to the 
Seventh Circuit, this evidence entitled the defendant to summary 
judgment.208   
  
 
200. See id. at 447 (holding summary judgment proper for the defendant because the plaintiff-
relator could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality standard based off evidence of the 
government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violation and its continued payment despite this 
knowledge). 
201. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 714 (7th Cir. 2015) (ruling in favor 
of the defendant because the plaintiff did not adequately prove an FCA violation). 
202. See United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (mem.) (2016) 
(granting writ of certiorari). 
203. See id. (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of [Escobar].”) (citation omitted). 
204. See Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d, at 447–48 (holding for the defendant because the 
plaintiff-relator did not properly make a claim based on implied false certification theory and because 
the plaintiff-relator could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality standard). 
205. See id. at 447 (“This matter is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court 
for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in [Escobar].”) (citation omitted). 
206. See id. (concluding the conditions of “the implied false certification theory” were not met 
by the plaintiff-relator). 
207. See id. (discussing how evidence of the Government’s continued business with the 
defendant shows evidence of the alleged noncompliance’s immateriality). 
208. See id. (determining “summary judgment [to be proper] because Nelson failed to establish 
the independent element of materiality . . . .”). 
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The position taken by the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits vary subtly 
from the Fifth Circuit’s position, but all these circuits strictly interpreted the 
Escobar Court’s ruling on the materiality of an FCA claim.  In each of these 
cases, the respective federal circuit court based its decision not solely just on 
the government’s actual knowledge, but also on the government’s actual 
behavior based on its knowledge.209  In each case, the circuit courts 
reasonably determined that when the government learned of an alleged 
noncompliance and did nothing to stop paying the violating contractor, then 
the contractor did nothing to defraud the government.210 
This common theme shows that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s belief, 
a bright-line rule for the materiality element of an FCA claim is possible.211  
Specifically, a rule making just one of the Escobar materiality factors 
dispositive.  Stated another way, when the government has actual knowledge 
of an alleged violation or noncompliance and continues to pay or pays the 
contract in full despite this actual knowledge, then that alleged violation or 
noncompliance is not material to the government’s decision to pay.  In these 




209. See United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 865 F.3d 29, 34–35 
(1st Cir. 2017) (noting the Government’s actions upon gaining actual knowledge of the defendant’s 
alleged violations showed the defendant’s alleged violations did not materially affect the Government’s 
decision to pay); see also United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 492 
(3d Cir. 2017) (explaining how under the FCA “it is the Government’s materiality decision that 
ultimately matters.”); see also Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447 (determining, based on Escobar, that 
the government’s behavior is key to a materiality determination in an FCA case). 
210. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 660–61 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(indicating a strong showing of the immateriality of a violation when the Government decides to pay, 
having actual knowledge of a contractor’s alleged misrepresentation, noncompliance, or violation and 
still continues to pay the contractor despite this actual knowledge); see also Nargol, 865 F.3d at 34–35 
(determining the Government’s continued business with the defendant, despite its knowledge of 
noncompliance, to show noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay the 
defendant); see also Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489–90 (finding the Government would have continued 
payment had it learned of Genentech’s omissions and showing the omission would “not [be] material 
to the Government’s payment decision”); see also Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447 (examining the 
record to find that despite gaining knowledge of the noncompliance, the Government chose to not 
penalize the defendant in any way). 
211. See generally Krause, supra note 26, at 1813–14 (noting how, in an attempt to keep with 
“common-law concepts,” the Supreme Court in Escobar “declined to set brightline rules” for any of 
the materiality factors it laid out). 
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V.    THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S BROAD POSITION ON MATERIALITY 
AND A POTENTIAL SHIFT IN ITS POSITION 
The strict interpretation of the Escobar Court’s materiality factors is not 
shared by every federal circuit however.212  The Ninth Circuit, for example, 
holds a looser interpretation of the FCA’s demanding materiality standard.  
In the Ninth Circuit, even if the government has actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance and pays the contractor despite this knowledge, 
the courts may still find the noncompliance to meet the materiality element 
of an FCA claim.213  Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, a contractor can accrue 
FCA liability more easily than in those federal circuits which strictly interpret 
the Escobar Court’s materiality standard. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Broad Position on Materiality 
The Ninth Circuit first took this broad position in United States ex rel. 
Campie v. Gilead Sciences.214  However, it has recently shown a shift in its 
position on the materiality of an FCA claim.215  Furthermore, as will be 
 
212. See Matthew K. Organ & Takayuki Ono, Escobar Decision Continues to Affect Major FCA 
Cases, THE ATTORNEYS OF GOLDBERG KOHN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.whistleblowers 
attorneys.com/blogs-whistleblowerblog,escobar-affects-major-fca-cases [https://perma.cc/HMA9-
9F48] (discussing how the Escobar decision created splits regarding the materiality of a claim when the 
government has actual knowledge of an instance of noncompliance and still continues to pay the 
contract, and how some federal circuits find the aforementioned government knowledge and payment 
to meet the FCA’s materiality standard and other federal circuits do not); see also Matt Curley, FCA 
Deeper Dive: Escobar and Its Aftermath—Part II, INSIDE THE FCA (May 23, 2017), https://www.inside 
thefca.com/fca-deeper-dive-escobar-and-its-aftermath-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/G5U5-GPXY] 
(explaining how the federal circuits are split on the issue of whether an FCA claim should automatically 
fail for lack of materiality when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s 
noncompliance and continues to pay the contractor or does not change its position in any way). 
213. See Anne K. Walsh, Ninth Circuit Revives False Claims Act Case Applying Escobar Materiality 
Standard, HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA: FDA L. BLOG (June 17, 2017), http://www. 
fdalawblog.net/2017/07/ninth-circuit-revives-false-claims-act-case-applying-escobar-materiality-stan 
dard/ [https://perma.cc/AN6L-CQZB] (examining the Campie case and discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
position that evidence of a noncompliance’s materiality is shown when the government has actual 
knowledge of the noncompliance and continues to make payments to the contractor). 
214. See United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 899 (9th Cir. 2017)  
(“We construe the Act broadly . . . .”). 
215. See Craig D. Margolis, Tirzah S. Lollar, & Michael E. Sammuels, Ninth Circuit Finds 
Continued Government Payments Show that Alleged False Statements Are Not Material, ARNOLD & PORTER 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/07/ninth-circuit 
-finds-continued-government-payments [https://perma.cc/R6E5-TFSH] (noting how a recent 
Ninth Circuit case may be signaling change regarding the materiality of an FCA claim when the 
government continues to make payments despite having actual knowledge of a contractor’s 
noncompliance). 
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explained in this section, the Ninth Circuit in Campie did not need to rule 
that it is still evidence of a noncompliance’s materiality when the 
government actually knows of the noncompliance and continues to pay 
despite this knowledge.  The Ninth Circuit’s position on the materiality of 
an FCA claim is based, in part, on prior Ninth Circuit precedent calling for 
a broad interpretation of the Act.216  This precedent, stemming from United 
States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix,217 still controls the Ninth Circuit’s 
judgment on FCA cases, despite being possibly preempted by the Escobar  
Court’s ruling.218 
In Campie, two relators alleged Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Gilead) violated the 
FCA by making false claims about the quality of its HIV drugs in its 
compliance forms submitted to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).219  Furthermore, the relators alleged that because of these false 
claims, Gilead received billions of dollars in Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursements.220  Specifically, the relators alleged Gilead used chemicals 
from unapproved manufacturers in China, and hid or altered this fact in its 
compliance communications with the FDA.221  Gilead did eventually seek 
the FDA’s approval for its Chinese source though.222  However, according 
to the relators, the company used the Chinese chemicals prior to seeking 
this approval.223  More so, the relators alleged that Gilead falsified its 
records in order to gain the FDA’s approval of the Chinese source.224  
To make matters worse, Gilead retaliated against one of the 
whistleblowers, Jeff Campie, by terminating his employment after he 
brought up concerns of Gilead’s alleged misrepresentations to the 
government.225  Adding to its suspicious behavior, Gilead then requested 
the whistleblower to sign an agreement barring him from bringing an action 
against the company under the FCA.226  Upon refusing, the two relators 
 
216. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 899 (9th Cir. 2017) (maintaining the Ninth Circuit’s precedent of 
broadly construing the FCA in order to combat any and all forms of fraud against the government). 
217. See generally Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170 (“The False Claims Act . . . is not limited to such 
facially false or fraudulent claims for payment.”). 
218. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (holding Hendow was overruled by the Escobar materiality standard). 
219. Campie, 862 F.3d at 895–98. 
220. Id. at 897. 
221. Id. at 896. 
222. Id. 
223. Id.  
224. Id.  
225. Id. at 897–98. 
226. Id. at 898. 
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brought this case in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California.227 
The district court twice dismissed the relators’ complaint for failure to 
state a claim.228  According to the district court, the relators’ FCA claims 
did not show that Gilead’s misrepresentations were material to the 
government’s decision to pay.229  However, the Ninth Circuit granted 
appeal because of the Escobar Court’s ruling on the materiality of an FCA 
claim occurring shortly after the district court rendered its decision.230  The 
Ninth Circuit determined the district court had erred when it ruled against 
the relators’ FCA claims.231  And, in a stunning reversal, the Ninth Circuit 
found for the relators.232 
To reach its decision, the Ninth Circuit first looked to precedent within 
its own jurisdiction.233  The Hendow case holds that the Ninth Circuit should 
construe the FCA very broadly in order to protect the government from 
fraud.234  Specifically, in regards to materiality, the court in Hendow held all 
that mattered was that a causal chain between the false statement and the 
government’s payment.235  Relying on this precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
proceeded to examine not only the FCA broadly, but the FCA materiality 
factors posited by the Escobar Court as well.236 
The Ninth Circuit heavily relied on the Hendow precedent because the 
district court determined the payor agency, the Center for Medicare and 
 
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
229. Id. at 899. 
230. See id. at 895–96 (noting the recency of the Escobar decision following the district court’s 
ruling in Campie as a reason for the Ninth Circuit to hear the case). 
231. See id. at 907 (“[R]elators allege more than the mere possibility that the government would 
be entitled to refuse payment if it were aware of the violations . . . .”). 
232. See id. at 909 (reversing the holding of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California and finding for the relators). 
233. See id. at 898–99 (stating the Hendow precedent governs the analysis of FCA complaints in 
the Ninth Circuit). 
234. See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170 (determining the FCA was designed to protect the 
government from any and all types of fraud and was given a broad scope by Congress in 1986). 
235. See id. at 1174 (finding a causal chain of connection between the alleged violation and the 
government’s decision to pay on a contract is necessary for a claim to meet the materiality element of 
the FCA).  
236. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 904–05 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors of an FCA claim 
and construing them to find evidence of materiality even when the “[g]overnment pays a particular 
claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated”). 
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Medicaid Services (CMS), technically was not defrauded for payment.237  
Furthermore, Gilead claimed the FDA approved its HIV drugs, providing 
evidence that its claims for payment to Medicare and Medicaid were not 
false.238  According to Gilead, the FDA became aware of its noncompliance 
after approving the Chinese source but still continued to approve Gilead’s 
HIV drugs despite knowing of the noncompliance.239  Gilead further 
claimed that the FDA’s approval shielded the company from FCA liability, 
utilizing a case from the Fourth Circuit to in an attempt to persuade the 
Ninth Circuit.240  However, because of the Hendow precedent, the 
Ninth Circuit was neither impressed nor persuaded.241 
The Ninth Circuit thought it insignificant that the payor agency was not 
technically the agency to which Gilead made misrepresentations.242  It first 
observed that both the FDA and CMS were overseen by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services.243  From this basic connection, the 
Ninth Circuit deduced that essentially Gilead committed fraud against the 
Department of Health and Human Services.244 
Next, the Ninth Circuit, mirroring the Third Circuit in Petratos, held that 
it was not the difference in federal agency that mattered, but whether or not 
the defendant induced the government to pay based on a 
misrepresentation.245  In other words, what were the government’s actions 
 
237. See id. at 903 (discussing why the district court dismissed the relators’ complaint and how 
it erred according to Hendow). 
238. See id. at 903–04 (noting Gilead’s defense to the relators’ FCA claims). 
239. Id. at 906. 
240. See id. at 903–04 (describing Gilead’s defense to the relators’ FCA claims based on 
Fourth Circuit precedent).  See generally United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., 745 F.3d 694, 
701–02 (4th Cir. 2014) (determining FCA cases are barred when the payment submissions are made to 
Medicare and Medicaid, and the FDA has already approved the drug). 
241. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 904 (holding the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, and thus the defense’s 
argument, to be unpersuasive based of prior Ninth Circuit precedent). 
242. See id. at 903 (asserting the distinction between the government agencies do not matter, 
only that a false statement was made to the government for payment). 
243. Id. at 903. 
244. Id. 
245. See id. at 903 (holding the government’s actions based on a contractor’s misrepresentations 
in a statement for payment mattered, rather than what individual agency paid and the one to which the 
misrepresentations were made); see also United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 
492 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussing the importance of the government’s actions in determining the 
materiality of an FCA claim and holding the government’s actions to control in the materiality analysis). 
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based on the misrepresentation?246  Based on this logic, a reasonable person 
would believe that the Ninth Circuit would then find a misrepresentation to 
be immaterial when the government had knowledge of the 
misrepresentation and continued to pay despite knowing.  However, the 
Ninth Circuit held otherwise.247   
When examining the materiality element of the relator’s FCA claim, the 
Ninth Circuit did utilize the materiality factors laid out by the Escobar 
Court.248  However, the Ninth Circuit examined these factors broadly.249  
The Ninth Circuit evidenced this broad interpretation by holding that the 
government’s continued payment despite having actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance was the inverse of what the Supreme Court 
reasoned this action to be.250 
In Campie, the Ninth Circuit held “proof of materiality can include” 
situations where the government makes continued payments to a contractor 
despite it having actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation of certain 
requirements.251  This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Escobar, which held this type of scenario to be evidence of the violation’s 
immateriality.252  Furthermore, this line of reasoning goes against the 
Ninth Circuit’s logic that it should be the government’s actions that dictate 
whether or not a violation was material to its payment decision.253  More 
importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit did not have to stretch the Escobar 
materiality factors to find against Gilead.   




246. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 903 (utilizing Hendow to hold that it matters not which federal 
agency was misled, but only that evidence can be shown to connect the false statement for payment to 
the government’s action of payment). 
247. See id. at 905 (determining evidence of an FCA claim’s materiality where the government 
pays a claim in spite of its actual knowledge of a violation by the contractor). 
248. Id.  
249. Id. at 905–06. 
250. Compare id. at 905 (finding proof of materiality to be in situations where the government 
continues to pay a claim in spite of having actual knowledge of a contractor’s violation), with Escobar, 
136 S. Ct. 1989,  2003 (determining the government’s payment, despite its actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s violation or noncompliance with an obligation, to be a factor showing the violation or 
noncompliance’s immateriality). 
251. Campie, 862 F.3d at 905. 
252. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
253. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 903 (determining the focus should be on whether the government 
was fraudulently induced to pay based on the contractor’s false statement). 
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FDA in order to obtain the approval of its Chinese source.254  In other 
words, the government did not have actual knowledge of Gilead’s 
violations.255  Any payment made by CMS to Gilead were fraudulently 
induced by Gilead’s initial misrepresentations to the FDA.256  Gilead 
actively covered up its Chinese source to gain FDA approval of its HIV 
drugs—so, from the beginning it was virtually impossible for the 
government to have actual knowledge.257  Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not 
need to hold the government’s continued payments after gaining actual 
knowledge of a violation to be evidence of the violation’s materiality in an 
FCA claim.258  The government in Campie did not have actual knowledge, 
and so its continued payments to Gilead did not constitute a scenario similar 
to the Escobar Court’s materiality factor showing immateriality.259 
Gilead did try to use the government’s continued purchases of the drugs 
after the FDA learned of Gilead’s violations as a defense.260  However, 
Gilead’s defense was terminally flawed because upon learning of these 
violations the FDA materially changed its position, ultimately calling for a 
recall of Gilead’s drugs.261  And, Gilead eventually stopped using its 
Chinese source, making any later payments by the government after the 
stoppage insignificant to the issue in the case.262   Moreover, Gilead used 
the Chinse source well before gaining FDA approval, and made 
misrepresentations to the FDA in order to gain the ability to be paid by the 
CMS.263  Gilead’s initial use of the Chinse source and its misrepresentations 
destroy any chance of the government having actual knowledge.264  This is 
 
254. See id. at 905 (noting Gilead’s alleged false claims were made to the FDA in order to gain 
its approval for Gilead’s HIV drugs). 
255. Id.  
256. Id. 
257. See id. at 906–07 (discussing how it is unclear exactly when or if the government gained 
actual knowledge of Gilead’s violations). 
258. Id. 
259. See id. at 906–07 (noting, from the record and from the positions of the parties in 
contention, it is very unclear whether the government had actual knowledge of Gilead’s alleged 
violations). 
260. Id. at 906. 
261. See id. at 906 (examining the evidence to find instances of the FDA warning Gilead of 
impurities, sending Gilead a letter of noncompliance, and of two recalls of Gilead’s drugs). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 896. 
264. See id. at 905 (“Mere FDA approval cannot preclude [FCA] liability, especially where . . . 
the alleged false claims procured certain approvals in the first instance.”). 
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because the payor agency was paying Gilead based on government approval 
gained through fraud.265 
In the end, the Ninth Circuit determined a genuine question of fact 
existed regarding whether or not the government had actual knowledge of 
Gilead’s noncompliance—justifying its reversal of the district court’s 
dismissal.266  As to Gilead’s defense, the Ninth Circuit found that there 
might be other reasons why the FDA continued its approval of Gilead’s 
drugs—though these other reasons were not stated in the opinion.267  Thus, 
the government’s continued payments after learning of Gilead’s violations 
could still be evidence of the violation’s materiality on its decision to 
continue payment.268  
The Ninth Circuit made the correct ruling in Campie.269  It is clear from 
the record in this case that Gilead intentionally defrauded the government 
of billions of dollars by making misrepresentations to the FDA in order to 
be reimbursed by the CMS.270  However, the Ninth Circuit did not have to 
reach this decision by finding evidence of the government’s actual 
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and its continued payment to 
the contractor to be material in triggering FCA liability.  Gilead utilized an 
unapproved source in China for its HIV drugs and then made false 
statements to eventually gain approval for this source.271  From the very 
beginning, Gilead concealed its source from the government until a couple 
of relators brought this to the attention of authorities.272  Gilead clearly 
committed a violation under the FCA, and the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
reversing the district court’s dismissal.  But, the Ninth Circuit did not need 
to broadly interpret the Escobar materiality factors of an FCA claim to 
achieve its result.   
Without actual knowledge, the government’s continued payment to a 
noncompliant contractor is not evidence of the noncompliance’s materiality 
 
265. Id. 
266. See id. at 906–07 (discussing whether or not the government had actual knowledge of 
Gilead’s violations and when it gained said knowledge). 
267. See id. at 906 (holding there are many possible reasons why the FDA continued to approve 
Gilead’s HIV medication after gaining actual knowledge). 
268. Id.  
269. Id.  
270. See id. at 895–99 (detailing the allegations against Gilead). 
271. Id. at 895–99, 906 (discussing how Gilead defrauded the government and finding that it 
obtained its FDA approval fraudulently). 
272. Id. at 895–99. 
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on the government’s decision to pay.273  With actual knowledge, it is.274  
In the Ninth Circuit, however, the government’s actual knowledge and its 
continued payment in spite of this knowledge is clearly not dispositive.275  
The Ninth Circuit may have so broadly interpreted the Escobar materiality 
factors in Campie because of the Hendow precedent.276  After all, the Circuit 
did shirk off a common theme among the federal circuits, which provided 
the makers of medications approved by the FDA with a shield from FCA 
liability in its pursuit of a reversal.277  However, as previously stated, the 
record showed Gilead intentionally defrauded the government to gain 
approval for its drugs, making both the FDA shield and the continued 
payment with actual knowledge defenses moot.278  
B. A Potential Shift in the Ninth Circuit’s Position 
In the two years since Campie, the Ninth Circuit has signaled that its 
position on the materiality of an FCA claim may be changing.279  A dynamic 
duo of cases lit the signal in 2018—United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell 
International, Inc.280 and United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute,281 
respectively.  It may now actually be that Campie is an outlier case in the 
post-Escobar world.   
 
273. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (finding it to be evidence of a noncompliance or violation’s 
immateriality when the government knows of said noncompliance or violation and continues to pay 
or pays the contract in full despite of this knowledge). 
274. See id. (stating actual knowledge is evidence of noncompliance’s materiality). 
275. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 905 (finding proof of materiality in an FCA claim to include 
situations where the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and still makes 
payments to the contractor in spite of this knowledge). 
276. See id. (determining, based on precedent from Hendow, that the Ninth Circuit should 
interpret the FCA broadly to encompass all forms of fraud, and holding it to be evidence of a violation’s 
FCA materiality even when the government continues to pay on a contract despite actually knowing 
of said violation). 
277. See id. at 906 (noting how other federal circuits are hesitant to rule on FCA claims involving 
drug manufacturers when the FDA has approved of the manufacturer’s drug); see D’Agostino v. Ev3, 
Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2016) (discussing how FDA approval shielded a drug manufacturer from 
FCA liability); see Petratos, 855 F.3d at 490 (explaining the impact of FDA on FCA claims). 
278. See Campie, 862 F.3d at 895–99, 904–08 (discussing Gilead’s alleged actions and finding 
Gilead made fraudulent misrepresentations in order to gain the FDA’s approval). 
279. See generally Margolis, et al., supra note 215 (discussing the potential impact of Berg on other 
Ninth Circuit cases, based on the Ninth Circuit in Berg finding evidence of immateriality when it was 
shown the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance and continued to pay 
the contractor in spite of this knowledge). 
280. United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 740 F. App’x 535 (9th Cir. 2018). 
281. Rose, 909 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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The first case to signal the Ninth Circuit’s new position on the materiality 
of an FCA claim was Berg.282  In Berg, the issue was not specifically about 
the materiality of an FCA claim.283  Rather, the case turned on whether the 
relators stated any part of an FCA claim.284  The relators alleged that 
Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell), made false claims regarding the 
installation of equipment to the United States Army for payment.285  The 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary 
judgment for Honeywell, ruling the relators failed to meet any element of 
an FCA claim.286  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.287   
Regarding the materiality of an FCA claim, the court in Berg correctly 
interpreted the Escobar materiality factors as intended by the Supreme 
Court.288  The Ninth Circuit found the Army to have actual knowledge of 
Honeywell’s allegedly fraudulent activity for an extended period of years.289   
Furthermore, the record showed that the Army continued to pay Honeywell 
for its services during this period of actual knowledge.290 
The Ninth Circuit determined this evidence to show Honeywell’s alleged 
fraud to be immaterial to the Army’s decision to continue payment.291  
Thus, because the relators could not meet the FCA’s demanding materiality 
element—and because they could not meet any of the elements at all—the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Honeywell.292  
 
282. See Berg, 740 F. App’x at 538 (holding the Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged 
noncompliance and its continued payment to Honeywell for a period of years to provide evidence that 
the alleged noncompliance was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay). 
283. Id. at 537. 
284. See id. at 537 (noting the relators are appealing a motion of summary judgment against 
them).   
285. Id. 
286. See id. at 537–39 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing the district court’s reasoning for finding that 
the relators failed to meet any required element of an FCA claim). 
287. See id. (agreeing with the district court’s findings that the relators failed to meet any element 
of an FCA claim). 
288. See id. at 538 (acknowledging the immateriality of an alleged violation on the government’s 
decision to pay when the government has actual knowledge of said violation and still continues to pay 
on a contract in spite of its actual knowledge). 
289. Id. 
290. Id.  
291. See id. (finding evidence of the Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged 
noncompliance and the Army’s continued payment to Honeywell to show Honeywell’s alleged 
noncompliance to be immaterial to the Army’s continued payment). 
292. See id. at 537–39 (finding the relator’s presented no triable fact for any of the required 
elements for an FCA claim and affirming summary judgment in favor of Honeywell). 
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However, the Ninth Circuit in Berg did not expressly overrule its prior 
holding from Campie regarding an FCA claim’s materiality.293 
The Ninth Circuit next revisited the issue of an FCA claim’s materiality 
in Rose.294  In Rose, a group of relators alleged the Stephens Institute violated 
an incentive compensation ban in the conditions for its federal funding.295  
That case was originally dismissed by the district court, but found new life 
thanks to the Escobar decision.296  The Ninth Circuit then heard the case to 
provide clarification on Escobar’s impact on Ninth Circuit precedent, 
affirming the district court’s ruling.297 
Providing some clarification, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
Hendow precedent still controlled in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of an FCA 
claim, with Escobar merely creating a “gloss” over the Hendow precedent.298  
In other words, the Ninth Circuit would continue to broadly interpret the 
FCA.299  Essentially, all that is required for a violation to be material is just 
some form of a causal connection between a contractor’s violation and the 
government’s decision to pay.300 
The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that evidence of the government’s 
actual knowledge of a violation and its continued payment to a contractor 
despite this knowledge was strong evidence of the violation’s 
immateriality.301  However, upon examination of the record, the 
Ninth Circuit found no evidence showing the government had actual 
knowledge of the Stephens Institute’s alleged violation.302  Thus, the 
 
293. See id. at 538–39 (discussing the Escobar materiality factors and finding evidence of the 
Army’s actual knowledge of Honeywell’s noncompliance and the Army’s continued payment to 
Honeywell to show the noncompliance to immaterial in its payment decision, but not mentioning its 
prior ruling to the contrary in Campie). 
294. See Rose, 909 F.3d at 1018–23 (examining the Escobar materiality factors and comparing 
these factors to the record in Rose). 
295. Id. at 1016. 
296. Id.  
297. See id. at 1017–23 (discussing the application of the Escobar standard for FCA claims and 
affirming the district court’s granting of summary judgment for Honeywell). 
298. See id. at 1020 (viewing Escobar “as creating a ‘gloss’ on the analysis of materiality”). 
299. Id.  
300. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(noting the requirement of a causal chain between the alleged false statement for payment and the 
government’s decision to make the payment). 
301. Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019. 
302. Id. at 1021. 
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Ninth Circuit did not directly revisit this issue or expressly overrule 
Campie.303  
It is worth noting that the dissent in Rose staunchly argued Escobar 
overruled Hendow.304  In his dissent, Judge Smith determined that Hendow 
no longer held control over the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of FCA claims.305  
Judge Smith rightfully pointed out that the Hendow precedent heavily relies 
on express conditions of payment to be determinative in a materiality 
analysis.306  This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar, 
which declared express conditions of payment to be relevant in a materiality 
analysis, but not dispositive.307 
The dissent argued the Hendow precedent requires the question of 
materiality to be, “whether payment is conditioned on compliance . . . .”308  
however, the correct question as determined from the Escobar dissent’s 
understanding of the materiality factors, is “whether the [g]overnment would 
truly find such noncompliance material to a payment decision.”309  Because 
the Supreme Court in Escobar determined the materiality question to be 
based off the government’s actions instead of what it labels as a condition 
of payment, the Hendow precedent regarding materiality has been 
overruled.310 
The Ninth Circuit is potentially shifting the position it took on the 
materiality of an FCA claim in Campie.311  This is evidenced by the Circuit’s 
 
303. See id. (noting the record’s lack of evidence regarding the government’s actual knowledge 
of the alleged violation, and thus the Ninth Circuit could not analyze the case based on this materiality 
factor). 
304. See id. at 1023–24 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing Escobar overruled Hendow’s materiality 
analysis because the Escobar analysis focuses on whether the government found the alleged violation to 
be material to its decision to pay, rather than a mere a condition of payment). 
305. See id. at 1023 (“Hendow’s materiality holding is no longer good law after Escobar.”). 
306. See id. (discussing how Hendow held express conditions of payment to be evidence of 
materiality). 
307. See id. (citing Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 
(2016)). 
308. Id. at 1024. 
309. Id. (emphasis added).  
310. See id. (noting the majority erred in finding Escobar did not overrule the Hendow precedent 
controlling the materiality analysis of an FCA claim in the Ninth Circuit, because the Hendow analysis 
runs contrary to how the Supreme Court determined the materiality of analysis to be in Escobar). 
311. See Carolyn Pearce, Why Escobar Materiality Rule Applies to California FCA, LAW360 (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1079561/print?section=california [https://perma. 
cc/NE6S-NRD4] (discussing the increasing influence of the Supreme Court’s ruling on an FCA claim’s 
materiality in Escobar on both the federal circuit level and on the state level in California); see Margolis, 
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acknowledgment in Berg and Rose that the government’s actions based on its 
actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance should determine an 
FCA claim’s materiality.312  Also, the Hendow precedent is starting to lose 
its grip on the Ninth Circuit, as is shown by the majority’s stretch to keep it 
alive313 and the dissent’s well-reasoned argument against it.314  The only 
thing holding the Ninth Circuit back might be that it is waiting for a case 
similar to Campie in order to officially change its position, as the result of the 
Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Berg and Rose support the argument that Campie 
is an outlier.315 
VI.    WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S STRICT POSITION SHOULD BE THE 
BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR MATERIALITY OF AN FCA CLAIM  
The section argues why the federal circuits—or the Supreme Court, if it 
decides to take another FCA case on the issue316—should adopt a position 
 
et al., supra note 215 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Berg, in which the Circuit determined 
evidence of the Army’s continued payments to Honeywell, despite the Army’s knowledge of 
Honeywell’s alleged violation for years, to be evidence of the violation’s immateriality to the Army’s 
decision of continued payment). 
312. See United States ex rel. Berg v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 740 F. App’x 535, 538 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(determining it to be strong evidence of a violations immateriality to the government’s decision to pay 
a contractor when the Army had actual knowledge of Honeywell’s alleged violations for years and 
continued to pay Honeywell despite this knowledge); see also Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019–21 (acknowledging 
it to be strong evidence of a violations immateriality to the government’s decision to pay a contractor 
when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged violations and continues to pay 
despite this knowledge, but not finding this situation in the case record). 
313. See Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019–20 (believing Hendow was “not clearly irreconcilable” with 
Escobar, despite admitting Hendow only explicitly considered express conditions for payment, but 
considering that Hendow might have been decided differently in light of Escobar) (quoting Miller v. 
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
314. See id. at 1023–24 (arguing Escobar overruled Hendow’s materiality analysis because Hendow 
focuses the analysis on express conditions of payment, but Escobar holds that the focus should be on 
the government’s action based on the alleged violation, noncompliance, or misrepresentation). 
315. See Berg, 740 F. App’x at 538 (acknowledging the Army’s continued payments to 
Honeywell, and its knowledge that Honeywell was allegedly noncompliant with its contract for years, 
to be evidence of the noncompliance’s immateriality on the Army’s decision to pay Honeywell); see also 
Rose, 909 F.3d at 1019 (finding immateriality to be shown when the government has actual knowledge 
of a violation and continues to pay on a contract regardless of this actual knowledge); United States ex 
rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905 (deeming it possible for the government’s actual 
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance or violation to still be evidence of the noncompliance or 
violation’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay the contractor). 
316. See generally Brian P. Dunphy & Nicole E. Henry, Third Time’s Not the Charm: Supreme Court 
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on the materiality of an FCA claim similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.317  
Specifically, FCA claims should fail for lack of materiality when the record 
shows the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s 
noncompliance with an obligation and, despite this knowledge, continued 
to pay the contractor.  This bright-line rule is limited, reasonable, and would 
efficiently ease the burden on the courts in deciding FCA cases.   
This section will first discuss how this bright-line rule is in line with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar.318  Next, the section will posit the 
potential benefits such a simple bright-line rule would provide to the federal 
courts and business which regularly contract with the government.  Lastly, 
this section will discuss the potential public policy implications such a 
bright-line rule could promote. 
A. This Bright-Line Rule Aligns with the Supreme Court’s Holding in Escobar 
The Supreme Court in Escobar held the FCA’s materiality standard to be 
a demanding one.319  That is because across many areas of the law, 
materiality focuses on the actions of the recipient of the 
misrepresentation.320  For example, in contracts law, misrepresentations are 
material if they are likely to cause a reasonable person to act.321  Similarly, 
in the law of torts, misrepresentations are material if a reasonably prudent 
person would find the misrepresentation to be influential in making his or 
her decision.322  Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary defines material to be 
“[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s 
decision-making . . . .”323  A bright-line rule automatically ending an FCA 
claim when it is shown that the government had actual knowledge of a 
 
gh-escobar-s-materiality [https://perma.cc/5G7B-LZQ6] (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
declined to build upon or clear up the confusion caused by the Escobar ruling for a third time). 
317. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 670 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(holding the government’s continued payments to a contractor despite knowledge of violations creates 
a presumption of immateriality; see also United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 
155, 156 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the Government regularly pays a particular claim in full despite actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, . . . that is very strong evidence that those 
requirements are not material.”) (quoting Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2003–04 (2016)). 
318. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (holding the government’s payment of a claim is evidence 
that certain requirements are not material). 
319. Id. 
320. See id. at  2002 (noting materiality is virtually the same across varying areas of law). 
321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).   
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
323. Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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contractor’s noncompliance with an express or implied obligation and 
continued to pay the contractor regardless of this knowledge is aligned with 
the Escobar Court’s holding and the varying legal definitions of materiality. 
This bright-line rule emphasizes the government’s actual knowledge and 
its actions based off its actual knowledge.  It does not heavily focus on 
conditions of payment as the Hendow precedent does,324 but instead focuses 
on whether the government was induced to act based on the contractor’s 
alleged noncompliance or violation.  After all, the Escobar Court did state 
conditions of payment were relevant, but not dispositive in an FCA 
materiality analysis.325 
Furthermore, this bright-line rule is limited.  The rule requires the 
government to actually have knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance, 
and the government’s continued payment despite this knowledge, for it to 
be triggered.  This limitation is shown by the Fifth Circuit in Harman, in 
which the court held it was clear and reasonable that the alleged 
noncompliance was in fact immaterial to the government’s payment 
decision because said payment was given after the government gained actual 
knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance; it was clear and reasonable that 
the alleged noncompliance was in fact immaterial to the government’s 
payment decision.326  However, as the Fifth Circuit has also demonstrated, 
if it is found that the government did not have actual knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance and made payments, then such lack of actual 
knowledge of the noncompliance is evidence of the noncompliance’s 
materiality.327 
Moreover, the Court in Escobar noted the FCA’s materiality analysis, while 
rigorous, was not so fact intensive that it could automatically survive 
 
324. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(discussing how Hendow heavily relied on conditions of payment in the FCA materiality analysis it 
posited, and arguing that Hendow does not align with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Escobar). 
325. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003–04 (determining the government’s conditions of payment 
to be relevant in a materiality analysis of an FCA claim, but not dispositive because not all conditions 
of payment are actually material to the government’s decision to pay a contractor). 
326. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 665 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(finding evidence of the government’s continued payment to Trinity, despite having actual knowledge 
of Trinity’s misrepresentations, to be evidence that the misrepresentations were immaterial to the 
government’s decision to pay). 
327. See United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses To Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(deciding a contractor’s violation of an obligation to be material to the government’s decision to pay 
the contractor when it was found that the government did not have actual knowledge of the 
contractor’s violation). 
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summary judgment.328  This means a bright-line rule making one of the 
Escobar materiality factors dispositive, is possible.  And, as the Escobar Court 
held, there are multiple methods under which the government or relators 
can bring an FCA claim in court.329  This bright-line rule, by focusing on 
whether the noncompliance was influential or induced the government to 
act, may be used either if express claims are violated or if the claim was 
brought under the implied false certification theory. 
B. This Bright-Line Rule Would Benefit Federal Courts and Government 
Contractors Alike 
Currently, there is a split among the federal circuits regarding the 
materiality of an FCA claim when the government has actual knowledge of 
a contractor’s alleged noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual obligation and continues to pay the contractor regardless of this 
knowledge.330  Increasingly, federal courts are finding the government’s 
continued payment, despite having actual knowledge of a contractor’s 
noncompliance with an obligation, is evidence the noncompliance was 
immaterial to the government’s decision to pay.331  In other words, a 
 
328. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6 (rejecting the contractor’s argument that the materiality 
analysis is “too fact intensive” to allow for summary judgment or motions to dismiss in FCA cases). 
329. See Johan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit Got Wrong, 68 S.C.L. 
REV. 845, 847–48 (discussing how an FCA claim may be brought by a contractor’s violation of an 
express condition of payment, and how the implied false certification theory evolved and became 
another theory under which an FCA claim may be brought). 
330. See Chow, supra note 85, at 581–82 (discussing the split among the circuits regarding the 
materiality of an FCA claim); see also Scott Roybal & Joseph Barton, Feature Comment: 2017 Civil False 
Claims Act Update, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, Nov. 15, 2017, at 1, https://www.sheppard 
mullin.com/media/publication/1681_TGC%2059-42-345.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR7S-MFN5] 
(discussing the potential circuit split the Ninth Circuit created by holding the government’s continued 
payment to a contractor regardless of its actual knowledge of the contractor’s violation of an obligation 
to be evidence of the violation’s materiality to the government’s decision to pay).  
331. See Bergman, supra note 4 (noting a majority of federal courts are taking “a more stringent” 
stance toward the Escobar materiality factor’s impact on the materiality analysis of an FCA claim); 
Steven A. Neeley & Brian Wagner, After Escobar, Materiality Matters, THE CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE 
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.contractorsperspective.com/false-claims-act/after-escobar-materiality-
matters/ [https://perma.cc/7BX4-DBSN] (explaining the Escobar decision’s materiality position and 
its impact on businesses); J. Andrew Jackson & Ryan P. McGovern, Judge Cites Escobar Materiality 
Standard, Vacates $350 Million False Claims Act Judgment, JONES DAY (Jan. 2018), https://www.jonesday. 
com/en/insights/2018/01/judge-cites-iescobari-materiality-standard-vacates [https://perma.cc/5H 
KJ-DEZV] (discussing how a federal district court strictly interpreted the Escobar materiality factors to 
find against the relators due to the relators’ failure to prove the government did not have actual 
knowledge of the alleged violations by a nursing home operators despite its continued payment, which 
showed the violations to be immaterial). 
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growing number of federal circuits are showing one of the Escobar 
materiality factors to be dispositive.  The Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding 
in Campie, however, has not been directly overturned.332  Meaning, the 
Ninth Circuit continues to ignore the Supreme Court’s determination that 
strong evidence of a noncompliance’s immateriality to the government’s 
payment decision exists when the government has actual knowledge of the 
noncompliance and continues payment.333 
Moreover, since the Escobar decision, businesses which regularly contract 
with the federal government have also experienced confusion in trying to 
understand the FCA and how to avoid accruing liability under it.334  Right 
now, a defense utilizing the government’s knowledge of the contractor’s 
alleged violation and its continued payment to the contractor to show the 
violation was immaterial to the government’s decision, is not viable 
depending on where an FCA claim is filed.335  Thus, government 
contractors are robbed of a common defense throughout the country to a 
federal law—the law we all must commonly follow336—if an FCA claim 
against them is filed in a federal district court in California instead of in 
Texas.337   
Even though the Escobar Court thought none of the materiality factors it 
posited were dispositive, a growing number of federal circuits seem to hold 
otherwise.338  These circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, hold so by placing 
the onus of the materiality analysis on the government’s actions that were 
 
332. Campie, 862 F.3d at 905; see also Daniel Wilson, 9th Circ. Won’t Revisit FCA Materiality Dispute, 
LAW360 (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1104764/9th-circ-won-t-
revisit-fca-materiality-dispute [https://perma.cc/8GBF-PS4D] (stating the Ninth Circuit did not 
directly revisit the issue of FCA materiality it was confronted with in Campie, and thus did not alter its 
position regarding FCA materiality). 
333. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1960 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gilead 
runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Escobar). 
334. See Seiden, supra note 31 (discussing how businesses regularly contracting with the 
government have been confused about how to properly avoid liability under the FCA since Escobar). 
335. Compare United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 667–68 (5th Cir. 
2017) (determining the government’s actual knowledge of Trinity’s alleged fraud to be evidence of the 
alleged fraud’s immateriality for the government’s decision to continue contracting with Trinity), with 
Campie, 862 F.3d at 905 (finding proof of a noncompliance’s materiality to the government’s decision 
to pay in situations when the government has actual knowledge of a contractor’s noncompliance, even 
though the government continues to pay or pays the contractor in full despite this knowledge). 
336. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing federal law as the supreme law of the land and 
essentially making it the general law all must follow within the borders of the United States). 
337. See supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
338. See Krause, supra note 26, at 1813–14 (discussing the weaknesses of the Escobar decision 
because it did not fully or clearly define materiality and did not hold any factor to be dispositive). 
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based on the contractor’s alleged violation of an obligation.339  Due to this 
growing trend, both businesses and the federal courts would benefit from 
making this one materiality factor a dispositive bright-line rule.  For when it 
is determined the government had actual knowledge of a contractor’s 
alleged noncompliance with an express or implied obligation and continued 
to pay the contractor, the claim should fail for lack of materiality.  
By having a reasonable and limited method to dismiss frivolous or 
insufficient FCA claims, federal courts could easily clear up some of their 
dockets.340  Furthermore, this rule would enable government contractors 
to more easily plan out a defense to FCA liability.341  During discovery, 
contractors would know to specifically look for evidence of the 
government’s actual knowledge of the alleged violation and the 
government’s continued payment or inaction despite this knowledge.  Thus, 
the bright-line rule is consistent with the Escobar Court noting that FCA 
claims must meet the heightened standard of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (9)(b).342  Courts would then be able to easily rule on motions 
to dismiss or for summary judgment in instances when the government had 
actual knowledge of a violation and, despite its knowledge, continued to pay 
the contractor.   
C. Public Policies This Bright-Line Rule Would Promote 
It is obvious that the general public policy behind the FCA is to prevent 
contractors from defrauding the federal treasury.343  It is smart the 
 
339. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1960 (discussing an emerging trend among federal courts to 
focus on the government’s conduct once it is determined the government had knowledge of a 
contractor’s noncompliance or violation of an obligation). 
340. See generally Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension—Part I: 
Fraud, 2019 GOV’T CONT. YEAR IN REV. BRIEFS 25, 25 (charting the total number of cases by fiscal 
year and showing 767 new FCA cases filed in 2018). 
341. See G. Christian Roux & John D. Hanover, Implied False Certification Liability Under the False 
Claims Act: How the Materiality Standard Offers Protection After Escobar, 38 CONSTR. LAW. 16, 21 (2018) 
(concluding an “effective defense” to an FCA complaint to be a showing of the alleged violations 
immateriality on the government’s decision to pay the contractor). 
342. See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 
n.6 (2016), (noting the materiality analysis is not “too fact intensive,” allowing for summary judgment 
in FCA cases, and noting that FCA cases must meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure); see also FED. R. CIV. P. (9)(b) (describing what a party must plead when the 
party is stating a claim involving fraud). 
343. See Douglas K. Rosenblum & John A. Schwab, FCA 101 A Practitioner’s Guide to the False 
Claims Act, CRIM. JUST. 26, 28–29 (discussing how the history of the FCA shows the intention behind 
the Act is to protect the government coffers from fraudulent government contractors). 
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government protects taxpayer funds.  Keeping with the public policy behind 
the FCA, the bright-line rule posited by this Comment would promote a few 
public policies which would help prevent future FCA violations.  First, the 
rule would incentivize contractors to disclose any noncompliance of express 
or implied obligations to the government.  Second, the rule would ensure 
the government is more careful in paying potentially noncompliant 
contractors.  And third, this bright-line rule would provide a limited and 
reasonable but necessary check on an incredibly powerful and broad federal 
statute. 
This rule would incentivize contractors to disclose violations to the 
government because as soon as the government has actual knowledge of the 
alleged fraud and does not cease paying the contractor, the contractor has a 
viable defense to FCA liability.344  With this guaranteed defense to 
incentivize them, contractors would likely be more open and honest in their 
business dealings with the government.  This incentivized reporting by 
contractors would also diminish the government’s heavy reliance on 
whistleblowers—who are economically incentivized—to report to the 
government any misdeeds of a contracting company.345  By having a rule 
incentivizing contractors to self-report their own violations, the government 
becomes better equipped with knowledge to protect taxpayer funds.  
Moreover, the federal government has openly called for contractors to 
voluntarily disclose instances of violations or noncompliance and to assist 
the government in investigating FCA claims.346 
 
344. See Italiano, supra note 63, at 1969–77 (discussing the Escobar decision’s impact on the 
health care industry as well as benefits and defenses to FCA liability provided by acts of self-disclosure). 
345. See Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/Y7A8-EW6K] (describing 
how much money the Justice Department recovered in 2018, and noting that whistleblowers filed 645 
FCA claims in 2018); Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act in Fiscal Year 2017, 
supra note 1 (describing how much money the Justice Department recovered from FCA claims in 2017, 
and pointing out that whistleblowers filed 669 FCA claims and earned a total of $392 million that year); 
Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-
false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/8T2G-JUJE] (discussing how much money 
the Justice Department recovered from FCA cases in 2016, and noting that, in 2016, whistleblowers 
brought 702 FCA claims and earned a total of $519 million). 
346. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ISSUES GUIDANCE ON FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT MATTERS AND UPDATES JUSTICE MANUAL, (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-act-matters-and-updates-justice-manual [https:// 
perma.cc/79BC-TNDZ] (promoting the Justice Departments guidance and incentives for contractors 
to voluntarily disclose information about potential violations or instances of noncompliance). 
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Even the FCA itself allows for reduced damages when contractors self-
report violations under the Act.347  The bright-line rule offered in this 
Comment, however, would likely prevent many FCA violations from 
happening at all.  By incentivizing contractors to report any noncompliance 
with an express or implied obligation, the government and contractor would 
have more time to remedy the situation before the contractor actually 
violates the FCA. 
As the Supreme Court held in Escobar, the FCA was never intended to 
prosecute garden variety contractual disputes.348  The FCA is very broad 
and powerful.  The Act’s penalties are seemingly merciless.349  However, 
despite the Court’s check on the scope of the Act, numerous FCA claims 
are filed each year.350  Not all of these claims are victorious for the 
government or relator.351  This means the FCA is being used to, or at least 
is being used in an attempt to, prosecute inconsequential or insubstantial 
contract disputes.   
The bright-line rule posited here, making one of the Escobar materiality 
factors dispositive, would provide a reasonable and limited check on the 
Act.  The rule would protect government contractors from facing costly 
FCA litigation in instances when their alleged violations were not actually 
material to the government’s payment decision.  The claim would 
automatically fail because the government already knew about the alleged 
violation and has shown through its actions that it does not care about the 
violation in rendering its payment decision.  Thus, a bright-line rule as 
posited here would ensure the FCA is utilized properly while promoting 
public policy.   
VII.    CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit correctly held when the government has actual 
knowledge of a contractor’s alleged violation and continues to pay the 
contractor, the continued payment is substantial evidence that the violation 
 
347. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2009). 
348. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
349. See Margolis, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the severity of the FCA’s punishments). 
350. See generally Fraud Statistics - Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/ 
page/file/1080696/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/9Y 
ZL-SWC8] (listing the total number of cases brought by the government and relators from October 1, 
1987 to September 30, 2018, which shows that a total of 2,448 FCA cases were brought between 2016 
and 2018). 
351. See United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 669–70 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(holding against the relator). 
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was immaterial to the government’s payment decision.352  The 
Ninth Circuit held to the contrary based off precedent overruled by 
Escobar.353  The bright-line rule posited in this Comment mirrors the 
Fifth Circuit’s position.  It makes just one of the Escobar materiality factors 
dispositive.  The rule offered here advances public policy in a limited and 
reasonable manner and eases the burden courts face in presiding over the 
numerous FCA cases each year.   
Overall, the bright-line rule offered in this Comment is a perfect fit for 
the post-Escobar landscape because it would promote sound public policies 
for both contractors and the government.  The rule is only applicable in 
limited circumstances.  The rule is reasonably based on an almost universal 
legal principal that for fraud or misrepresentation to be material it must be 
influential on the recipient’s actions.  More so, a growing number of federal 
circuits are interpreting the Escobar materiality factors in a manner that is 
similar to this offered bright-line rule.  And, most importantly, the rule is in 
line with the Escobar Court’s holding on the materiality of an FCA claim. 
 
352. See id. at 665–70 (holding the government’s actual knowledge of the contractor’s alleged 
omission and its continued payment to the contractor showed overwhelming evidence that the alleged 
omission was not in any way material to the government’s payment decision). 
353. See United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding materiality can be found when the government has actual knowledge of the contractor’s 
alleged violation and continues payment to the contractor). 
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